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# PAKISTAN: A MUSLIM PROJECT FOR A SEPARATE STATE IN INDIA

5 February 1943

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# PAKISTAN

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# PAKISTAN

## 1. What is Pakistan?

Pakistan ("Land of the Pure") is a name for a proposal adopted by the Muslim League of India at its Lahore session on March 26, 1940 to separate India into distinct nations on the basis of cultural homogeneity (see section 14). Those parts of the country in which the majority of the population is Muslim, it was stated, would become "Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." The areas involved are indicated in the resolution as "the North Western and Eastern Zones of India." Discussion by various Muslim speakers at that time and before and after that time shows that the specific delimitation of the proposed Independent States varies, but the Northwestern Zone would include parts or all of the following regions: the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind, Kashmir, all of which lie in India, and Afghanistan, which is already a sovereign nation. The Eastern Zone would consist of Bengal or parts of Bengal and Assam.

The name Pakistan is not used in the Muslim League's formal resolutions advocating independent Muslim states, but it has come to be the popular designation for the scheme and is commonly employed by the press and public speakers.

The scheme has been advocated politically since 1930, but got its greatest encouragement from the Cripps proposals (March 29, 1942) for Indian constitutional reform. These proposals, while providing for a United India Dominion, conceded "the right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it is so decided. With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be

prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union." This status was to include the right of secession from the British Empire. Indian (Native) States were also to have their status readjusted. These various provisions recognizing the general principle of self-determination would have made possible a full implementation of the Pakistan idea.

2. Purpose of this Memorandum.

It is the purpose of this memorandum to study the historical basis for this demand, to specify the contemporary issues which are responsible for the Pakistan movement, to consider the strength of its support, the strength of the opposition to it, especially among the Muslims, and the effect which the movement would have if successful, and to lead up to a conclusion concerning a possible solution of the problem. Since Pakistan is one of India's most pressing issues, the study is necessary for understanding the current scene and estimating India's political part in the war.

## Background of the Pakistan Movement

3. Hindu-Muslim Differences.

The two great social divisions of India--Hindu and Muslim--have been hostile to each other since the Muslims first began to invade India at the beginning of the 8th century. The difference between the two is fundamentally religious and social, but it has taken on secondary economic and political features.

The basis of the clash lies in the fact that the religions, Hinduism and Islam, differ radically on many important points, beginning with actual creed. Hinduism tolerates any shade of dogma, while Islam insists that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is his Prophet. Hinduism takes a thoroughly intolerant stand on social matters, insisting on the institution of caste, wherein all men are born to a graded place in society, with the Brahman, "a god on earth," at the top and the outcaste Untouchable at the bottom. But Islam quite literally regards all men, at least all Muslims, as equal. Hindus decorate their temples profusely with images of gods, human beings, and animals and use idols in worship to call the gods to mind. The Quran, however, strictly forbids the representation of any animate object, and Muslims destroy the Hindus' images. The Hindu attaches a peculiar sanctity to the cow and considers cow-killing only less sinful than Brahman-killing; the Muslim slaughters and eats the cow even as Christians do. Hinduism is the most self-satisfied of religions; it has no missionaries, makes no converts; the only way to be a Hindu is to be born one. Islam, however, is aggressively proselytizing. Hinduism uses the native Sanskrit as its classic language; the other, the imported Arabic and Persian; hence the two have never been able to read each other's sacred literature.

Bitter and historic enmity divides the two faiths. The Hindus for a thousand years (711-1707) suffered continually at the hands of the Muslims, whose degree of ruthlessness varied in different periods, though their contempt for the heathen never wavered. The Muslims periodically plundered the Hindus' homes, looted their cities, burned their books, demolished their temples, slew their priests, abducted their women. Hindus fear a recurrence of these horrors if the Muslims should again become India's rulers. With the Muslims it rankles that they, the conquerors of the Hindus, have lost their dominance under the Pax Britannica and become the lesser community in wealth and education and therefore in power.

The history of upper and middle class India until the British and French control began to grow strong was largely one of Hindu-Muslim relations. The efforts during that period and since to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity by seeking a basis for common life, loyalty to a common heritage, and submergence of divisive elements, has had only the minimum of success. The lower classes, it is true, have always got along together sufficiently well. They have been too deeply engaged in the business of earning enough for mere existence to indulge in the luxury of quarrels over religious and social dogma. Today, as in the past, the Hindu-Muslim conflict appears chiefly among the middle classes; the lower classes are relatively free of it. But on all levels of society there is no intermarriage between the two communities, and social intercourse of other sorts is severely circumscribed.

4. The Muslim Sense of Community.

With the high importance which Muslims attach to dogma and their generally democratic social order, the Muslims have developed a strong sense of community. This expresses itself in congregational worship in the mosque. There a great open courtyard may be filled with a thousand faithful worshippers, whose voices and bodies rise and fall in the unison of prayer. This phenomenon is unknown in Hinduism. When a Hindu goes to a temple, he worships by himself and in undertones. Caste has split his society, and intellectual freedom has individualized his religion. His basic concept of Utopia is philosophic anarchy. The Muslim's, however, is the well-drilled regiment. The sense of belonging to a community, despite many sectarian differences, gave Islam the drive that carried it, within a century and a half after the Hegira (622 A.D.), across North Africa and into France in the west, and to the Indus in the east. Professor Snouck-Hurgronje, one of the ablest western interpreters of Islam, has characterized the Muslim achievement of community consciousness as beyond the social accomplishment of any other religious group. This feeling is especially strong in India, where the Muslims are a minority, and it provides the cohesiveness that gives them a power of aggressive action out of proportion to their numerical strength.

Sects. In spite of the Muslim sense of community, real in all Islam, but uniquely so in India, there is not complete unity, theologically or politically. Sectarian differences affect current Muslim politics, including the issue of Pakistan, and a brief discussion of the sects is in order here. It is regrettable that the last complete Census of India so far published, that of 1931, did not give full statistical data concerning these sects. Nevertheless, the divisions can be described with considerable exactitude.

The principal groups are the Sunni and the Shiah. This schism is ostensibly based on differing concepts of the succession to the Khilafat (Caliphate, spiritual headship of Islam). The Sunnis, "the orthodox," "the people of the sunna (path)" follow theologically the traditional teachings. Politically they recognize as valid the right to office of the first three Khalifs (Caliphs) and the right of each succeeding Khalif to appoint his own successor. The Shiahs, "sectarians," are followers of Ali, the fourth Khalif, who was the son-in-law of Muhammad, and his family. They consider him Muhammad's rightful successor and believe that the succession should be in his family.

The basis of the Sunni-Shiah breach, however, was perhaps something other than one of religious doctrine. The Shiahs were mostly Iranians, who have always differed from the rest of Islam, and the sectarian difference may be a political rationalization of a deep-seated Iranian dislike of the Arabs who conquered them. Instead of a Khalif, the Shiahs have an Imam, "leader," who is their spiritual head.

Shiah centers in India are in the Deccan at Hyderabad; in Western India chiefly in the cities of Bombay and Surat; and in Northern India, especially at Lucknow, which is the chief Shiah center for all India. Nowhere else are the two Muslim communities brought into such close contact as in India. Sunni-Shiah riots are common in Lucknow, and on the northwest frontier the two groups find it advantageous to maintain separate communal existence.

The sectarian differences within Shiah Islam rest again on the question of the succession or Imamate. The "Twelvers" believe there were twelve Imams, the last one of whom has disappeared from human sight but still lives to carry on his leadership "hidden." The "Seveners" believe that the Imamate ended with Ismail, who was the seventh.

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According to a special, very small group, the Imamate has re-emerged in the person of His Highness the Agha Khan, in whom is summed up the spiritual essence of Muhammad and his successors. It is well, when we see the Agha Khan labelled "the spiritual head of Indian Islam," to realize that in reality he heads only a very small group, probably not over 100,000, known as the Agha Khan Khojas, who are Nizaris belonging to the Ismaili branch of the Shiahs of India.

Tables follow here to show the interrelationship of the Muslim sects and their estimated percentages throughout India and in the northwestern "Pakistan" area. In 1931 the Sunnis outnumbered the Shiahs in northwestern India about 33 to 1. In the diagram various important sects are shown, though it does seem not necessary to discuss them at length in the text. It is evident, however, that the sectarian divisions of Islam in India are complex and adverse to completely unified Muslim action.

# PRINCIPAL SECTS OF INDIAN ISLAM*




*Percentages based on figures given in M. T. Titus, Indian Islam, pp. 237-8, based on good guesses in the "Annuaire" of La Revue du Monde Musselman, 1925. Figures from 1931 Census of India.

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## Sectarian Statistics in North-West Pakistan Areas*

(1931 Census)

| | Total Population | Muslim Population | Sunni | Shiah | Ahl-i-Hadith | Ahmadiyya | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Punjab | 28,490,857 | 14,929,896 | 14,276,642 | 338.779 | 182,544 | 55,908 | |
| Sind | 3,887,071 | 2,830,800 | 2,720,529 | 110,147 | | | (Khoja, 10,234) |
| North-West Frontier Province | 2,471,527 | 2,250,389 | 2,208,417 | 35,461 | 2,586 | 3,706 | |
| Baluchistan | 868,617 | 798,093 | 767,114 | 5,961 | 108 | 122 | (Zikri, 24,231) |
| Kashmir and Jammu | 3,646,243 | 2,817,636 | 2,521,480 | 201,758 | 8,777 | 3,148 | (Qadian, 198) |
| Northwest Pakistan with Kashmir | 39,364,315 | 23,626,814 | 22,494,182 | 692,106 | 194,015 | 62,884 | |

*Figures for the Muslim sects in the North-East Pakistan area (Bengal and Assam) are not given in the 1931 census.



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5. The Muslim Theory of the State's Relation to Religion.

The problem of Hindu-Muslim relations is complicated at its base by conflicting theories of the relation between the state and religion. The Muslim theory, in its orthodox and extreme form, is strictly one of a theocracy. Islam is less a state religion than a religious state. Muhammad considered himself the "warner" of his people, calling them to islam (submission); and their duty, as that of all people, is to become muslim (submissive) to all that Allah wills. Possessing the truth, as they believed, the early Muslims considered the function of a warner a function of the state. To make conversions to the faith was the highest purpose of nationhood. From its inception, therefore, Islam was promoted by military and political means as no other religion ever has been.

The Muslims viewed the world as composed of two hostile military camps. One was the "abode of Islam" (dar-ul-islam), where the true faith was established; the other was the "abode of war" (dar-ul-harb), where Islam was not established and false doctrine prevailed. By strict theory a ruler in the abode of Islam was under obligation to convert the abode of war into a land of the faithful. He might endeavor to do so by making a demand of conversion upon the unbeliever state. If this were accepted, all was well; but if it were not, then he must use force and wage a holy war (jihad) of compulsory conversion.

The conquered were to be treated in two different ways according to their previous religious condition. "People of the Book"--Jews, Christians, Magians, Sabaeans--whose scriptures are considered to be in the correct line of tradition though corrupted, had a choice between becoming Muslims or paying a poll tax (jizyah) for "protection." If they remained unconverted, their lives were spared but they could not enjoy citizenship. People who were not of the book had either to become Muslims or be put to death.

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The harsh and extreme application of Muslim theory is obviously impracticable in a state where the conquered populace is stubborn and will not relinquish its old religion. A conquering expedition, especially if it means to occupy the country and live in it, cannot afford to exterminate the peasants, artisans, and tradesmen, however great its zeal for the faith. For this reason many people conquered by Muslims have been allowed to keep both their religion and their life, though it may be with impoverishment, humiliation, and even slavery. The Hindu was one of these; but in keeping his life, he was subjected to the poll tax. He received a higher status than that allowed by strict Muslim law yet as low as it was feasible for the Muslim conquerors to impose.

6. The Hindu Theory of the State's Relation to Religion.

The Hindus have no such theory of the state. They do not regard it as divine will that all people should be Hindus, nor do they accept, even in their most extreme moments, the notion that all the world must be under a single rule. Whenever a mythical king is represented as forming a universal empire, "uniting the world under a single umbrella," the feat is acclaimed as evidence of his individual superiority but not as fulfillment of some cosmic purpose. The traditional Hindu considers religion a strictly personal matter; each man believes and practises that for which his particular degree of intelligence or "soul-development" fits him. All his deeds in many preceding existences have brought him to his present state and capacities, and it is idle to think that any external force can alter these capacities. The Hindu will let every other man have full freedom in practising his religion; all he asks is that he should himself be allowed to pursue his religious duty as he sees it, without interference.

It is this emphasis on individual duty that gives the key to the Hindu attitude concerning the relation of religion and the state, that is, more narrowly and for all practical purposes, the relation between kingship and religion. The idea is associated with the theory of caste. Every person is born to perform some function which fits into the universal order. This function is his caste duty, and the degree to which he fulfills that function is the degree of his success in life. It can profit him nothing to forsake his own function, however humble, and perform that of someone else. Says the Bhagavad Gita, "Better to do one's own duty poorly than another's duty well." By doing his present humble duty well he will be born to a better state in the next existence. Hence a person born as a member of a ruling caste has ruling as his sole duty. Ruling consists in administering the affairs of the kingdom for the benefit of the subjects and in

protecting from molestation the holy men who are performing their sacred rites. Failure in either respect means failure in his duty, and disaster will come upon both him and the realm in consequence. But he has no obligation to make territorial conquest or to extend the borders of the Hindu faith. Non-Hindu barbarians (mlecchas) in foreign parts should be allowed to remain in their deplorable state; they deserve it. In the next existence they may possibly have the good fortune to be re-born as Hindus.

Thus to the traditionally educated Hindu the Muslim theory of the state and religion is illogical and unintelligible, and the whole attitude of Muslims toward the spread of Islam is merely confusing. When the Muslims overran India, destroyed, plundered, and killed, the Brahman not only resented the suffering that fell upon himself and his fellows; he also despised the conquerors as savages, irrational and mentally immature. He had to yield to force, but his contempt for the victor was unalterable and unconcealed.

7. Enforcement of the Muslim Theory of the State in India.

Two such varying theories of the state were mutually incomprehensible to their respective proponents. If the Hindus and Muslims could have understood each other on the issue, they might at least have cultivated a reciprocal respect. As it was, each felt the other entirely unenlightened, and the side in power at any one time thought it had the right to impose its will upon the other. Expediency was the prime consideration that modified application of this policy.

The Muslim invaders of India were for many centuries inclined to assert their theory of the state as far as practicable. Sometimes a conqueror might perpetrate wholesale devastation and general massacre in the name of the religious state and the holy war. Almost never did he refrain from greater or less plunder.

There was a notable change under the great Mughul Emperor Akbar (1556-1605), who took a positive attitude toward the rights of Hindus and endeavored to reconcile Muslim and Hindu. His successors, Jahangir (1605-1628), and Shahjahan (1628-1658), modified only slightly his policy of leniency.

Conditions were vastly different under Aurangzib (1659-1707), last of the great Mughuls, who inclined to strict application of the Muslim theory. His reign is still excoriated by Hindus, while his chief opponent, the Maratha chieftan Sivaji, is a national hero. Since Aurangzib's death and the consequent decline of Muslim power, the Muslim theory of the state has been in abeyance, though its validity is still an axiom of Islamic religious fundamentalism.

8. Decline of Muslim Power and Influence in 18th and 19th Centuries.

Probably the most powerful psychological factor in Muslim dissatisfaction with India's present political condition and prospects is the nostalgic memory of Muslim rule, especiallyas that rule reached its apogee under the Mughul emperors from Akbar to Aurangzib in the 16th and 17th centuries. The glory and wealth of these emperors, the splendor of their courts, the cultured patronage of painting, architecture, literature that flourished there stir the pride of Muslim India today. The great power which Muslims wielded through the Mughul dynasty inspires a belief that those great days can return, and the conviction that Islam is Allah's will for the world induces a mystic faith that their return is certain.

It was a calamity and a mistake, in Muslim opinion, that the Mughul empire disintegrated in the 18th century under the blows, first, of the Marathas and, secondly, of the British. The Marathas, being Hindus, and the British, being Christians, were both infidels. Each, in the fundamentalist Muslim view, should give place in the future to the Muslims whose heaven-sanctioned power they usurped.

The economic decline of the Muslims followed their political decline in the 19th century, when British rule in India was being confirmed and extended and the economic order was generally being altered. Revenue collection was being readjusted; native handicrafts were being destroyed under the impact of western industrialized commercial penetration; methods of transport were revolutionized through the building of railroads; and in some measure capital was employed to construct an Indian textile industry. Education was transformed by the establishment of a westernized state system of education, and political theories were revised in consequence of acquaintance with western social, economic, and political theory which Indians came to know.

The Hindus were far quicker than the Muslims to adjust themselves to the changed conditions. While the Muslim community still dreamed of its past and resented the present, the Hindus sought a share in modernization. It would be a gross error to say that the Hindu community as a whole was progressive, but many individual Hindus sought personal advantage for themselves in the changing order. The result was that the great number of government positions open to Indians fell to Hindus, and the prizes of business enterprise were theirs too. By the time the 19th century was three-fourths over, the Muslims in India were a backward group in relation to the Hindus. The old Muslim landlords, who held their position under government title, were still in possession of large sections of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the United Provinces; but in other respects the Hindus had a preponderant advantage. It was inevitable that this condition should conduce to inter-community jealousy among the middle classes.

9. Revival of the Muslim Community.

The Muslim reaction to the inferiority which the community was experiencing was twofold. It was sometimes puritanical and fundamentalist; it was sometimes modernist. Each attitude has helped to create the Indian Muslim religious nationalism now expressing itself in the demand for Pakistan.

Puritanism in Indian Islam comes from the Wahhabis, among whom in our day Ibn Sa'ud of Arabia is the outstanding political figure. These are the followers of 'Abd al-Wahhab, who lived in Arabia in the 18th century. He inveighed against all innovations (bid'a), that is, things which had become usual in Muslim belief and practice but had been introduced since the time of the Prophet. To him they obscured and frustrated the true Muslim teaching; therefore they should be abhorred, and all material innovations, such as domes, cupolas, decorations, music, should be destroyed. Back to original Islam was the cry.

Wahhabi missionaries came to India at about the beginning of the 19th century. They were shocked by conditions there, where infidel Hindus and heretic Shiah Muslims flourished. They proclaimed the land Dar-ul-Harb (Abode of War), and demanded punishment for renegade Muslims and a perpetual crusade for the conversion of Hindus. The movement still has many followers of its theory, though few attempt to use its radical methods. It is eternally vigilant for the preservation of Islam from threatened corruption and has given rise to such organizations as the Ahl-i-Hadith (People of the Traditions) and Ahl-i-Quran (People of the Quran), which the Indian census returns as sectarian groups.

The modernist effort to restore the prestige and position of the Muslim community was not motivated by religion so much as by a desire to achieve a political and social prominence in the new largely

Anglicized Indian community. The prophet of the movement was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). Sir Syed was one of the great men of India in the 19th century; he was certainly the most influential figure in Indian Islam during that period. His philosophy was aligned with that of Islamic modernists in the Near East, particularly in Egypt, who abandoned the old narrow dogmatic position of the faith. According to them the holy Quran is applicable to all peoples at all times. The two camps of Islam and of war, they felt, were not conditions of political nationhood but really states of the human heart. The duty of a Muslim, they taught, is to spread Islam by precept and example rather than by violence, and the true teaching of Islam is love for all one's fellow human beings. The political implication of the teaching is that Islam is not destined to be an international state under the banner of religion, but an attitude of mind belonging to Muslims, who would render temporal fealty to many national governments.

Sir Syed recognized the value to India of the peaceful rule of the British. During the Mutiny of 1857-58 his loyalty was unswerving, though the Muslim community was chiefly responsible for the trouble. Nor did he share the Muslim resentment of the severity used in repressing the Mutiny. His program called for recognition of British rule in India as Dar-ul-Islam (Camp of Islam), for Muslims, under British rule, had the privilege also accorded to Hindus of living according to their own religious law. He pled publicly for freedom of religion and the subjection of Islamic tradition to historical criticism. He warmly defended the inspiration of the Quran but left its current interpretation and its application in modern times to individuals, not the authorities of old. With a liberal philosophy of his own, he preached liberalism to his community, using his compelling intelligence and personality to make his work effective.

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As part of his program he advocated reform of Muslim education by separating it from traditional religious instruction and secularizing it. Modern science and history were fundamental in his view. In 1875, to implement his ideas, he founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. This was successful from the start, and it grew both in number of students and scope of intellectual instruction until in 1920 it was chartered as the Aligarh University. It is the leading force today in shaping the opinions of Muslim leaders in India.

Though Sir Syed believed in inter-community cooperation of Muslims, Hindus, and others, the communal character of his institution has in recent years led it away from that ideal rather than toward it. The Aligarh University, in spite of its educational eminence, is the center of Muslim communalism today. Modernism has been accepted by Muslims not so much for its own sake or for the improvement of individuals as for advancing the interests of the community, which is deeply conscious of itself as a whole. At Aligarh the anti-Hinduism of Islam is expressed in modern terms and applied to modern issues. Religion is not stressed, but the essence of the place is economic, social, and political secularism.

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10. Contemporary Hindu-Muslim Issues.

The most potent contemporary Hindu-Muslim issues are not the religious and social--these lie in the background ready to operate under stimulus--but the economic and political. 1/ These latter operate on all social levels but most effectively among the middle classes.

The economic clash may rise when Muslim peasants are dealing with a Hindu landlord, or when Muslim debtors have a grievance against Hindu or Sikh moneylenders, or when Hindu industrial workers are opposed by Muslim strike-breakers. 2/ In the Punjab the landlords are frequently Hindus and the peasantry Muslim. Once a conflict occurs between land-owner and land-tiller, a religious difference converts it into a communal clash. In the case of money-lending, circumstances are slightly different. Muslims are strictly forbidden by the Quran to accept interest, though they often practice devices for evading the prohibition. Hence Muslim usurers are rare; but Hindus, lacking such religious prohibitions, frequently are moneylenders. 3/ Muslim debts, therefore, are generally owed to Hindus or Sikhs, and again economic resentment is quickly transformed into a religious quarrel. Since almost every poor man in India is deeply in debt, the fact becomes of great importance.

In industrial disputes, a large number of floating strike-breakers are available from the Pathans in the northwestern part of India, whose country is economically incapable of supporting them. When mill-workers in Bombay, who are preponderantly Hindu, go on strike, the clash with the Pathan strike-breakers, who are Muslims, is also converted into an inter-communal religious quarrel. Another type of industrial basis for communal clash exists in Bengal, where Muslims have a virtual monopoly in the ownership of certain industries, such as

tanning and beedi (cigarette) manufacture, and other skilled trades, arts, and handicrafts. They are alleged to put economic pressure on employees to change their religious affiliation.

The political conflict focuses on the system of "communal representation." This is a system of allocating legislative seats and political appointments among members of the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and other communities according to fixed ratios. The chief constituencies are the "general," which is mostly Hindu, and the Muslim. The proportionate distribution of legislative seats varies in the different provinces. Government appointments also vary. Of the central government appointments, 25 percent are Muslim, 8 1/3 percent are Christian, Anglo-Indian, etc. The rest are chiefly Hindu.

The system was first adopted in 1909 at the time of the "Morley-Minto Reforms," when it was proposed as a method of allaying communal strife. There had been bitter feeling between the two communities since 1905 when Lord Curzon, the Governor General, had divided Bengal into two parts, one of which was predominantly Muslim (see below in section 12). Several years later the two communities were quarreling over the question of representation in the Legislative Councils which were then being planned. The later reforms of 1919 and 1935 continued the system of communal representation and extended the number of communities entitled to special representation. But no revision of the system has ever checked the evils it produces. Each minority community wants weighted representation and, no matter what weightage it gets, demands more. The majority group, on the other hand, resents every reduction of the natural advantage its numbers would give it if unimpeded.

Just as Muslims strive for communal preferment through a political organization (Muslim League), so too the Hindus have a party

(Hindu Mahasabha) which aims to promote their interests. The Congress party (Indian National Congress), which claims to have no communal bias, does not fully satisfy either community. The Muslim League flatly accuses Congress of being a Hindu controlled organization operating to the advantage of Hindus. The Hindu Mahasabha, however, feels that the Congress is too prone to favor the Muslims. The communal quarrel for legislative seats and government appointments is the most disruptive force in all Indian political life.

The political issue between Muslims and Hindus became especially bitter in 1938, when the provincial ministries were set up according to the new 1935 constitution. The Congress had a majority in seven of the eleven provinces and formed a coalition government in an eighth. The Muslims complained that the Congress party unfairly excluded Muslims from the ministries. It allowed portfolios, they claimed, only to those Muslims who were among the small numbers from that community which belongs to the Congress party and ignored members of the Muslim League, who, they said, really represented the Muslim group. When the Congress party members resigned their ministerial posts late in 1939, as a protest against the Governor General's action in declaring India in the war without inviting legislative action, the Muslim League proclaimed a Day of Deliverance on December 22. It thanked God for "freeing them from the oppression of the Congress ministries," and has celebrated the day annually ever since. They recited at that time a list of "atrocities" committed by the Congress. These included the use as a national language of the Hindi, rather than the Urdu, variety of the language Hindustani--though the differences between the two varieties are only those of script and choice of learned vocabulary, nothing fundamental. The Muslims also objected to the use of the Congress flag as the national emblem and the adoption

of a Hindu song (Bande mataram) as the national anthem. The opposed the Wardha Scheme of Education, which Congress supported, as parochial, Hindu, and neglectful of Muslim interests. The League also alleged discrimination against Muslims in public service, deplored the promotion of Congress propaganda in Indian States, and protested against the appointment of Muslims from Congress party ranks for positions open to Muslims.

Such jealousies provide a constant tension between the Muslim and Hindu communities, which may make their relationship snap on very small provocation, as when a Hindu wedding procession passes a mosque and fills the air with music, which strict Muslims think defiles the holy spot. Similarly, Hindus are enraged when Muslims kill a cow, sacred in their faith. The deep historical hostility of creed and rule, the current economic and political issues, and the minor irritations of divergent social practice, set a stage of disunity in which the divisive project of Pakistan seems to many members of the weaker community the reasonable and sole solution of the total problem.

11. Efforts Toward Hindu-Muslim Harmony.

The most natural resolution of the Hindu-Muslim conflict would be for the Hindu elements to assimilate or absorb the Muslim, as they did with the intrusive Hellenistic civilization in the early centuries of the Christian era. Islam, however, has been much more stubborn in resisting the Hindu embrace than was Hellenism, which latter never seemed highly self-conscious. The fate of absorption or assimilation is precisely the most deadly fear of Indian Islam. Its strong sense of community leads it to many forms of resistance, as has already been indicated in previous sections of this discussion.

Besides the strictly cultural values involved in the Hindu-Muslim clash, there is the effect it has upon the country's political unity. Every great ruler of India has wanted to unite India into a single political unit. Many obstacles have intervened, but since the time of the Muslim invasions, the Hindu-Muslim antipathy has been paramount. The one Indian ruler to make any notable effort toward overcoming it was the Mughul emperor Akbar (1556-1605). He considered the religious root of the discord, and being a great irenicist, eclectically pieced together materials from both Islam and Hinduism and proclaimed a new religion, the Din Ilahi (religion of God) with himself as its head. After Akbar's time the effort to syncretize Islam and Hinduism got no further imperial support. The next two emperors, Jahangir (1605-1627) and Shahjahan (1628-1658), put no obstacles in its way, but the Emperor Aurangzib (1659-1707) conducted a fanatic campaign against Hinduism in favor of the greater glory of Islam. Akbar's attempt at harmony had little direct result, but it established a precedent and gave the highest temporal approval to the program.

Various efforts have been made by religious teachers of one or the other community to produce Hindu-Muslim unity. The most notable

of these were Kabir (1440-1518), who established a sect called the Kabirpanthis, and Nanak (1469-1538), who was the founder of the Sikh religion. Politically the latter has been the more important. Nanak gathered disciples (sikhs) about him, who were to be the nucleus of a great movement to unite the two groups, Hindus and Muslims, both religiously and socially. As usual in such a movement for unity, the reform merely produced a third group. The Sikhs, through a succession of ten teachers, evolved amazingly from the simplicity of the saintly, gentle life of the founder into a militant commonwealth, which now feels itself akin to the Hindus and at enmity with the Muslims. Their sense of community is as strong as that of the Muslims themselves: when two Sikhs meet, their greeting is Khalsa ki jai ("Victory to the Sikh confederacy!").

Following Kabir and Nanak have come many others who, in the warmth of religious devotion, have tried to unite the two communities. All these movements have a contributory effect toward Hindu-Muslim harmony, though none--or all of them together--has been successful in their common aim.

In the 19th century there was relatively little effort to bring Hindus and Muslims into political unity. The Government of India has generally thought of the Muslims as its more tractable subject group in India and before the present war recruited most of the Indian army from them. This policy, though a little surprising in view of the fact that the Mutiny of 1857-58 was chiefly a Muslim affair, is explicable on the ground that both the Government of India and the Muslims have recognized that their chief common threat is the great Hindu majority of the country.

In the 20th century, the Hindus became especially conscious of the need for Hindu-Muslim reconciliation. The quarrel between

Hindus and Muslims over the partition of Bengal (see sections 10, 12) had split the two communities wide apart, and the growth of Indian nationalism with its program against British imperialism had not brought the two together. Rather the split had been widened by the Indian Councils Act of 1909, when communal electorates had been created (see above in section 10). In the first world war the question of the Caliphate agitated Indian Muslims, who resented the removal of the Turkish sultan from the position of Caliph more than did the Turks themselves. The Indian National Congress joined the Muslims on this issue in agitation against the British. Under Gandhi's leadership from 1919 to 1922 there was a temporary association of the two communities, but they parted later on the unfailingly provocative question of communal representation. The fact that they could unite, even temporarily, has encouraged many Hindus and Muslims alike to believe that a permanent association is possible.

There is a steady, if slow, fusing of Hindu and Muslim elements to constitute Indian civilization. Interaction in art, manners, language, psychology, temperament are obvious among the middle classes. Religious ideas of one faith influence members of the other, as when Muslims sometimes show honor to the Hindu ethical doctrine of ahinsa, that is, non-injury of living creatures (Gandhi's "non-violence"). In social matters there is significance in the fact that many millions of Muslims have "castes," thus aligning themselves with the social system which governs the relations between Hindus, though it is contrary to the democratic tenets of Islam. This process in itself is insufficient to produce Hindu-Muslim unity, but it affords hope that the problem is capable of solution if only new circumstances are created to help obliterate the present conflict.

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PROMOTERS OF PAKISTAN

12. The Muslim League.

The Pakistan scheme is promoted by the Muslim League under the leadership of its president, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The League was organized on September 30, 1906, to protect and advance the political rights of Indian Muslims and, according to the statement issued at the time, "to prevent the rise among them of hostility toward other communities."

The circumstances leading to the formation of the Muslim League grew out of the Partition of Bengal. In 1905 the Governor General (Viceroy) Lord Curzon, had announced that for administrative efficiency the then huge province of Bengal was being partitioned into two provinces. The eastern part of the province was combined with the province of Assam into a single new province called "Eastern Bengal and Assam," and the remainder of Bengal, which then included Bihar and Orissa, was to remain the province of "Bengal."

When the announcement was made the Muslims were pleased, because the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was predominantly Muslim, and the Muslims therefore were acquiring a province. The Hindus, however, were aghast, for they thought that their beloved province of Bengal was being violated before their eyes. The reason for the partition, they averred, was the rising nationalism of the Bengalis. They spoke with vehemence for a revocation of the arrangement, and the discussions inevitably took a polemical turn of Hindu versus Muslim.

The Muslims were alarmed at the possibility that the Hindus might succeed, as they actually did in 1911, and to preserve the newly created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam as well as generally to promote Muslim interests, some of the community leaders organized the Muslim League. Among its specific aims was also that of obtaining for

Muslims a due share of government posts. Still another purpose was to give the Muslim community political organization, since it was apparent that India would soon be granted the right to elect some of the members of the provincial councils. This right was shortly afterwards defined in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, commonly known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, which introduced the principle of communal representation (see above in section 10). Other original objects of the Muslim League were promotion of loyalty to the British government and the placing of Muslim "needs and aspirations before the government in temperate language."

From its inception in 1906 until 1936, the Muslim League met sporadically when its leaders thought there were public issues at stake affecting their community. It helped to create the continuing demand for separate communal electorates, and its representations have been largely responsible for the extension of the system to its present proportions. It has convinced many Muslims that no other recourse is open to the community to secure legitimate demands, and its communal arguments have suggested to the Sikhs that they make similar demands for themselves, lest they be overwhelmed by the Muslims in the Punjab. Its example has also led the depressed classes to feel that they too can profitably use the method to assert their claims against the orthodox Hindu community.

The Muslim League and the Indian National Congress at Lucknow in 1916, in agreeing on the terms of Indian self-government within the Empire, also reached an agreement concerning communal electorates. In this way the League forced the majority party of India to recognize the principle for which it had been fighting.

At about the same time the League and the Congress joined in supporting the Khilafat movement. This was a Muslim movement of

protest against the provision in the Treaty of Sevres to dissolve the temporal and spiritual union in one person of the Sultanate of Turkey and the Caliphate of Islam. Here, too, Congress had to make a concession to the Muslims to win their support for nationalism and the non-cooperation campaign.

When the Amritsar Massacre took place in 1919, the two communities were equally shocked and felt the need for common action against the British. At this period the leaders of the League were also members of Congress. During the years 1920-22, however, many Muslims came to distrust the Congress program, which they feared was both pro-Hindu and radical, and resigned from the Congress.

By 1931 the temporary alliance between the League and Congress had been broken. One of the most important causes lay in the activities of a Hindu reform sect, known as the Arya Samaj. This sect conducted a vigorous campaign of "purification" (shuddhi) to reclaim for Hinduism many low castes which had come to be Muslims. The bitterness of the quarrel led to murders and consequently to inter-community distrust. At the same time the Hindu Mahasabha was rising. This is the Hindu counterpart of the Muslim League in its communal aims and tries to further the sectional interests of orthodox caste Hinduism.

Mr. Jinnah, now president of the Muslim League, had resigned from Congress by that same time, and already devoted to his communal policy, was engaged in anti-Hindu controversy. He attended the first Round Table Conference (1930) in London for devising a new constitution and there urged the claims of his community. The communal award embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 was the result chiefly of the Muslim League demands, which the British made no objection to granting in part, though the League was not satisfied.

Since 1935, when the new constitution was adopted, the League has been engaged in unremitting conflict with the Congress. From 1936

the League has been under the control of Mr. Jinnah, recognizing him as Qaid-i-Azam ("Great Leader", Duce, Fuehrer). Its goal has been to protect Muslim interests which it believed were more seriously threatened than before by the (still unrealized) proposal of the new constitution to create a Federal India, uniting British India and the Indian States in a closer political entity than exists now. The scheme of federation, the League claims, would deliver India--and themselves--to majority rule, that is, to rule by the Hindus.

In the 1937 elections for the provincial legislatures, which had been revamped by the new constitution, the Muslim League vigorously contested seats and tried to unite all Indian Muslims under its banner. Yet out of the 482 Muslim seats to be filled in the 11 provinces of British India the League won only 108. Congress won seven provinces outright and had a plurality in an eighth. There has been no general election since 1937, and it is impossible to assess accurately the present strength of the Muslim League. In the House of Commons on October 8, 1942, Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for India, said, "At the 1937 elections the League was merely one of a number of Muslim parties. Since January 1938, the League or coalitions supported by the League have won 46 out of 56 by elections in Muslim seats, while Congress has only won three." He did not state what number of these contested seats the League already held. It is usually considered that the League now has more general Muslim support than it had in 1937.

The Congress party in setting up its provincial ministries in 1938 ignored the League, as has been described above (section 11), and aroused Muslim resentment. Out of this resentment the Muslim League drew strength for itself. It uses the occurrences as an illustration of its thesis that every devolution of political power from British into Indian hands has placed the Hindus in a position of greater

dominance over the Muslims and led to exploitation by the Hindus to the disadvantage of the Muslims.

When the Governor General (Viceroy) declared India in the war, without submitting the question to the central legislature, the Muslim League was offended, like all the other Indian parties, though like them it expressed its abhorrence of Fascism and Nazism. It reiterated then, as it has constantly done since, its unwillingness to accept "majority" rule and condemned the Congress administration of the provinces as undemocratic.

In March 1940 the League finally adopted the proposal that India must be separated into Hindu and Muslim states, according to the scheme which is known as Pakistan. This scheme, as we shall see below (section 14), had existed before but had never been taken seriously. Pakistan had been a kind of Muslim Never-Never Land, a fairy tale Utopia, but it now became the essential minimum of the League's program.

In the summer of 1941 the Viceroy set up a National Defense Council and invited the Muslim premiers of the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam to sit on it. Two of these declined, but the third, Mr. Fazlul Huq of Bengal, accepted. The Muslim League forced him to resign, but only with bitter resentment on his part.

When Sir Stafford Cripps went to India in March 1942 to make proposals for settlement of the constitutional question, the Muslim League rejected them on the ground that they did not give sufficient recognition to the League's two-nation position. The Cripps plan allowed for non-adherence of a province or an Indian (native) State to the proposed Dominion and made possible the establishment of several dominions depending upon the expressed will of the population. But this right of non-adherence or of secession from the Dominion

after its formation was not sufficient for the Muslim League. It wanted separation of the Muslim areas from the Hindu areas before the imposition of a new constitution, without reference to a plebiscite. At the same time, of course, it berated its perennial foe, the Congress.

Since then the League or Mr. Jinnah has made numerous political statements, but in every case the emphasis has been put on the attainment of Pakistan as the essential condition before Muslims will consider any scheme for revising India's constitution or for conducting an interim government until the war is over.

The strength of the Muslim League membership is not known, although it is supposed to be about a million or something less. Its backing comes from wealthy Muslim land-owners, princes (both Hindu and Muslim), and British commercial interests, particularly those centering in Calcutta. 4/ All three of these elements have reason to dislike Congress, since it has favored a number of agrarian reforms which seem to lead toward peasant or state ownership of land, as in Russia, and abolition of the landlord class. It wants also to democratize the Indian (native) States, remove the arbitrary powers of the princes, and take away their personal revenue derived from exploitation of the peasants within their borders. Congress is also the protege of India's own industrialists, who support it with heavy financial contributions, encouraging a program that would make the Indian market a field for a greatly expanded native industry, while injuring the position of the European business interests.

Whatever may be the feeling of individual Muslim members of the League concerning the peril Hinduism holds for Islam, it is clear that the supporters of the League donate their money to fight Congress as a threat to their vested interests.

There must also be more than coincidence in the fact that the League's prestige is based to a very high degree upon the recognition

which it receives from the Government of India. Statements made by British public men--such as Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for India--represent the Muslims of India as united on political issues and as having the Muslim League as their sole spokesman, though there are many Muslims who do not belong to the League or approve its policies (see below in section 16). It can hardly be doubted that the Government of India finds it convenient whenever there is an increase of the Muslim League's strength, for it becomes thus a more effective counterpoise against Congress.

13. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Leader of the League.

The dictator of the Muslim League is Mr. Muhammad (or Mahomed) Ali Jinnah, and it would be impossible to understand the position of the League today and its manoeuvers without having some idea of the personality of its head.

Mr. Jinnah's background would not seem to have fitted him to be the leader of a communal organization which professes to uphold Muslim orthodoxy. He was born (December 25, 1876) in Karachi of a Khoja family belonging to the Agha Khani sect. This group, as was pointed out above (section 4), belongs to the heterodox Shiah division of Islam and is very small, perhaps only 100,000 in number. The Khojas, besides being heterodox Muslims, are both biologically and culturally the product of a mixture of Shiahs with Hindus.

Religiously, his Islamic roots do not penetrate deeply. "Mr. Jinnah was never known to be devout, pious, or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Quran as and when he was sworn as an M.L.A. (Member of the Legislative Assembly) he does not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special tenets...Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah...He is prepared to die for Islam...No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allahu Akbar ('Great is Allah!') and 'Long live Qaid-i-Azam!'"5/ He is generally regarded today as an essentially unspiritual person who has gone hundred-percent Muslim to build up his power and is contrasted with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, president of the Indian National Congress, who is an eminent Muslim divine, born in Mecca, educated at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and recognized by the religious leaders of Indian Islam for his scholarship, piety, and impeccable Muslim traditions. Mr. Jinnah's education and life, instead of being Muslim, have been in the European tradition. Even his first speech is English.

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In middle life Mr. Jinnah stepped beyond Muslim practice by marrying a Parsi girl (daughter of Sir Dinshaw Petit). This marriage was not only unusual but actually might have seemed to presage that he would engage in no kind of communal activity.

When Mr. Jinnah entered politics, he did so again as a progressive, anti-communal Muslim. He became an advocate in the Bombay High Court in 1906 and at the same time secretary to Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, a Parsi, known as the "grand old man" of Indian politics, who was then President of the Indian National Congress for the third time.

In 1910 Mr. Jinnah became a member of the Imperial Legislative Council. During that same year he moved a resolution in the Indian National Congress, of which he had become a prominent member, condemning the principle of communal representation which had been instituted under the Morley-Minto reforms and urging general Indian unity. The resolution was courageous and was considered anti-Muslim by the fundamentalist members of his community.

Mr. Jinnah was a faithful member of the Congress urging communal unity until the Nagpur sessions in 1920. This meeting was a personal triumph for Gandhi. The official historian of the Congress has remarked, "Seasoned men like...Jinnah...were simply overpowered. If the situation did not give rise to feelings of jealousy, it must be due to the splendid character of our political leaders."6/ During the years 1920-22, however, many of the more conservative members of the League resigned from the Congress. It seems that for Mr. Jinnah, too, the Congress meeting of 1920 marked the beginning of a metamorphosis.

In 1928, when the Motilal Nehru report on a new constitution for India was presented to the All-Parties Conference, Mr. Jinnah opposed it and veered from his previous demand for unity to the support of communal electorates. He summarily adjourned the Muslim League and then temporarily disappeared from prominence in the Indian political

scene, though he attended the first Round Table Conference in 1930 and insisted there upon increased Muslim communal representation in the constitution which was to be drafted.

In 1934 he was elected permanent president of the League and since then has been its dictator. He and it are now inseparable. His followers call him Qaid-i-Azam, which means "Great Leader" (Duce, Fuehrer). He exercises the functions of that post to such a degree that he alienates powerful supporters. When Mr. Fazlul Huq, premier of Bengal, resigned at the demand of Jinnah from the League's Working Committee in 1941, he did so on the ground that "recent events had forcibly brought home to him that principles of democracy and autonomy were being subordinated 'to the arbitrary wishes of a single individual who seeks to rule as an omnipotent authority even over the destiny of thirty-three millions of Muslims in the province of Bengal who occupy the key positions in Indian Muslim politics.'"7/

Mr. Jinnah himself is reported to have said, "Make me the dictator, put matters in my hand, and I shall show you whether I cannot fill every high post in the land with efficient Muslims."8/ His followers passed a resolution at the Pakistan Day celebration in Calcutta, March 23, 1942, saying, "This meeting emphatically declares the Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, alone represents and is entitled to speak on behalf of the Muslim nation." In April 1942 he was granted extraordinary powers by the League "to think and act" for it, without consultation, for the period of one year.9/ The Modern Review, a pro-Congress monthly, speaks editorially of him as "the uncrowned king of the Muslims."10/

His mildest opponents, like Mr. K. Natarajan, editor of the Indian Social Reformer, may speak of him as "a great Indian nurtured in Nationalism who gave way to a temporary aberration in advocating Pakistan,"11/ but his bitterest foes use such epithets as "militant

communalism personified--a modern and abridged edition of Aurangzib,"12/ or "the little Hitler of Malabar Hill."13/

Whether a dictator or not, he has great power. In August 1942, when the Congress was outlawed after declaring for a campaign of Civil Disobedience, and the leaders were arrested by the government and general disorder followed, Mr. Jinnah gave orders that no Muslims should participate in the demonstration. Though a few did take part, their numbers were small, and Hindu-Muslim conflicts have not taken place.14/

Among his personal characteristics his wit is proverbial, though tinged with sarcasm. He dresses elegantly, whether in the creations of Bond Street or the more recently affected Muslim attire. He has few friends, and only in recent years has he become a man of the people. He is sensitive to slight and extremely conscious of personal dignity. It was an insult--to the Muslim community, as he put it--when in Simla, where no one rides in a car except the Viceroy, one was sent to convey the frail Mr. Gandhi to an interview with the Viceroy, while Mr. Jinnah himself, being physically robust, was expected to come without a car. And when in February 1942 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, visiting India, expressed a desire for a conference with Mr. Jinnah, the latter said that it was inconvenient for him to come to Delhi but he would be happy to see the Generalissimo in Calcutta. The Generalissimo went.

In spite of his exaggerated egotism, he has a reputation for strict personal honesty. For example, his fundamental desire that India should be independent of Britain has led him to bitter anti-British hostility from which he could not be distracted by any bribe, even that of high office. He was successively offered, and he successively refused, a judgeship in the Bombay High Court and the office of Advocate General of India.

There is a legend growing up about him which reflects an attitude of devotion among his followers scarcely less than that which might be paid a deity. On April 3, 1942, for instance, he entered Allahabad in state. Two zamindars (landholders) rode with him on a specially decorated truck through streets which were gala in welcome. The procession passed under 110 arches, each named for a person important in Indian Islamic history, beginning with the first Muslim sultan to land on India's shores and ending triumphantly with Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He addressed the Momins, the poor of the Muslim community (see below in section 16), decending from the truck to do so and speaking of mutual loyalty between them and the League. Honorific speeches were presented to him, including one which brought his name "in the line of the Prophet and the Asar saints" (companions of successors of Muhammad).15/ Oratory, lights, pageantry, and general excitement reign at the League meetings. The Pakistan flag is flown, money is collected, and Mr. Jinnah's speech--a short part in unaccustomed Urdu and a long part in English--produces a near frenzy in the audience.

His sense of his own importance expresses itself in ways that lead non-followers to consider him psychopathic. He assumes a position toward his followers not unlike that of Hitler and preaches Pakistan with an intensity not unlike Hitler's advocacy of national socialism.

Yet many persons who have talked with Jinnah feel that he does not expect ever to achieve Pakistan. He wields it as a club, they think, to exact concessions for the Muslims from the Hindu majority. This opinion was general before Cripps made his constitutional offer in March 1942. The hope of achieving Pakistan which that offer extended may well have altered Mr. Jinnah's view. The scheme may have seemed to him afterwards as not merely the hopeless wish of a nostalgic Indian Islam. The dream may have begun to acquire potential reality. Mr. Jinnah is a man who would have perceived the alteration, if it had

occurred, and be quick to take advantage of the new situation to transform dream into fulfillment. He apparently felt that his cause had a set-back on December 17, 1942, when the Viceroy (Lord Linlithgow) in an address at Calcutta said that India needed to be a unit. Mr. Jinnah was bitter in his comment, and Mr. Rajagopalachariar, who favors a compromise Pakiston solution (see below in section 18), was also disappointed.

## THE PAKISTAN IDEA

14. The Proposal.

Pakistan means "the land of the Pakis," that is, of the people who cherish pak. The word pak is difficult to translate. It means all that is sacred and noble in the life of a Muslim; the closest equivalents are "pure, clean, sacred, pious." The formation of the word Pakistan is Persian, and it is said to have been carried by a political philosopher from Eastern Iran who settled in the Punjab. It was applied specifically to the Muslim areas of India in 1933 by Mr. C. Rahmat Ali, who introduced it as a political designation to differentiate those areas from Hindu India. Mr. Rahmat Ali may be considered the founder of the Pakistan movement.

The idea of separate Muslim and Hindu states is older than 1933. For many years before that time the Muslims had had their own political goal, which corresponded to the Hindu goal of remaking India in the Hindu mold. The Muslim people were to erect a Muslim kingdom in northwestern India to include those sections where the population is prevailingly Muslim. Many prominent persons supported the idea, including the great Muslim poet, the late Sir Mohammed Iqbal (1876-1938), who stated that he felt himself less a citizen of India than of Islam and in his later years wrote in Persian rather than his native Urdu. He proposed it before the Muslim League in 1930, when he was President, but it was not adopted. Later he is said to have repudiated the idea, but his original advocacy is still quoted in support of the proposal (see below in section 16). India did not take the idea very seriously, though commentators pointed out that the proposed kingdom would be contiguous to Afghanistan and so link up with the rest of the Muslim world, which extends unbroken from Central Asia to the western coast of Africa. It was sometimes remarked that such a Muslim kingdom

in northwestern India would create an opportunity, if not actually extend an invitation, for another Muslim invasion.

Mr. Rahmat Ali proposed that the vague hope of Muslim political self-realization should be defined and then be made the object of all Muslim endeavors in India. There is no doubt that many fundamentalist Muslims agreed. He circulated his proposal to members of the Third Round Table Conference, which was considering a new constitution for India, but it was not brought officially before the Conference. The British government would not consider the proposal because they thought it "a revival of the old Muslim Empire."16/ The Muslims came in time to think more seriously of the idea. As it became less novel to their ears, and as the communal quarrel with Hindus became more acute, it seemed to embody the hopes of some sections of the community as no other possibility could. As their grievances increased under the Congress ministries from 1938 on (see above in section 10), these sections usually turned to it, and in 1940 it became a part of the Muslim League's program.

The Pakistanis, "those who propose Pakistan," regard the Hindu-Muslim problem not as involving groups within a single nation but as international, involving the relations between two separate nations which have been arbitrarily combined into a single state.

The territory involved in the different proposals for a Muslim state vary. Sir Mohammed Iqbal was concerned with northwestern India, not very sharply delimited. Pakistan extremists now think not only of this area but also of Afghanistan, and every geographic unit of India--city, district, or province--containing a Muslim majority. One grouping corresponds to an acrostic interpretation of the word Pakistan, with rationalization, though false, of the origin of the term. According to it, P stands for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and TAN for Baluchistan. Mr. Rahmat Ali, in his vision of Muslim

India, saw three divisions within India, namely Pakistan (the Northwest), Bang-i-Islam (Bengal), and Usmanistan (Deccan), with one additional division outside India, namely, Afghanistan.

The official Muslim League resolution asks for two independent states, consisting of the Northwestern and Eastern Zones. The resolution is quoted below:

> March 1940: "(a) Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
>
> (b). That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests, in consultation with them, and
>
> (c) In other parts of India where the Musulmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.
>
> The session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defense, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."17/

The various proposals for Pakistan which have been mentioned, divide India into parts, by allotting to the new nations provinces and states as now delimited. Other proposals have been made which call for a division based upon redrawn provincial boundaries. One such is that of Dr. Ambedkar, the principal leader of the Depressed Classes (Untouchables) of the Hindus. This group fears the middle and upper

caste Hindus who dominate the Indian National Congress, and Dr. Ambedkar therefore does not side permanently with either the Congress or the Muslim League. He believes that a better kind of Pakistan would be one in which the Punjab and Bengal were divided internally with the predominantly Muslim districts separated from the others. As he remarks, his division of Bengal corresponds with that of the partition of Bengal in 1905, which was bitterly opposed by the Hindus but favored by the Muslims and led to the formation of the Muslim League (see above in section 12).

More inclusive schemes are also advocated, as for example, one by Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, published in 1942, which claims for Pakistan "the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, the Punjab, Baluchistan, the Delhi Province a part of the United Provinces, Kashmir, Assam, Bengal (except two districts), Hyderabad, a part of the Deccan and some districts of Madras."18/

Mr. Jinnah's latest scheme, as rather vaguely reported in the New York Times, appears to cut across provincial boundaries, possibly along the lines of Dr. Ambedkar's plan.19/

A map accompanying this memorandum indicates the boundaries of various proposed forms of Pakistan.

There are other aspects of the Pakistan proposal besides that of religious geography. One of the most important of these is economic. Within the Pakistan area, according to all schemes, are large regions--notably Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province--which are not economically self-sufficient, but have constituted a "deficit area" for British India. They have been dependent upon the rest of the country for an annual fiscal subsidy, each of about $1,000,000 yearly.20/ Leaguers speak hopefully of levying higher taxes in such areas and developing mineral resources. Mineral resources are certainly there, especially oil, but to what extent

is not known, since the reports of preliminary surveys have been inexact. If Pakiston were to be a completely independent state, its economic difficulties might be too serious for it to meet and it would therefore be tempted to seek control of richer sections of India for its own benefit. Since it appears to be the Muslim League position that Pakistan should constitute an independent state with its own currency, coinage, finance, foreign relations, defense, tariff, and transport facilities, the problem of its present economic insufficiency has dangerous potentialities.

There is a fear in many Indian quarters that the Muslims have much more grandiose conceptions than are implicit in the Pakistan proposal. Muslims have made statements which arouse these fears and seem to justify them. One author looks to "a great federation of self-governing Islamic States from Cape Verde to Java," as a sequel to European imperialism.21/ Another says, "Pakistan is not the final goal of the Muslims. We want more. Pakistan is only the jumping-off ground. The time is not far distant when the Muslim countries will have to stand in line with Pakistan, and only then will the jumping-off ground have reached its fruition."22/

The Muslim League frankly claims that Pakistan is not democratic in the sense that it would not represent the will of a majority of India. It even seems that the Muslim League realizes the plan may not represent the will of the people in the area proposed as Pakistan, for the League objected to the provision of the Cripps scheme that adhesion of the provinces to the Indian Union should be referred to a plebiscite of the provinces. It wanted an advance guarantee of Pakistan without taking a popular vote. (see below in section 15). Spokesmen for the League have repeatedly made clear its anti-democratic attitude. An editorial in the Star of India, an organ of the League, said, "We accepted the electorate scheme because it was

not democratic...Pakistan will never lead to civil war, but opposition to it...will lead to bloodshed and civil war."23/ Another editorial in the same paper says, "What about India with 400,000,000 people, with many languages, many religions, many races, many interests and divergent ideologies? Can this huge mass of humanity be marshaled and disciplined either into ahinsaic (non-violent, Gandhian) democracy or any democracy at all? The solution lies in not one but several partitions and self-determination wherever possible."24/

In spite of the varying definitions of Pakistan, the idea itself now dominates the Muslim League. Says Mr. Jinnah, "We do not believe in Pakistan through British aid or under the British aegis. Pakistan is an article of faith with Muslim India and we depend on nobody except ourselves for the achievement of our goal, and Muslim India is ready and willing to face any opposition or obstacle from whatever quarter it may come."25/ Whether or not Mr. Jinnah is justified in trying to speak for the whole Muslim community on this issue we shall examine below (section 16). But his own efforts are today concentrated on keeping it as a goal for the Muslim League and in using it to achieve the maximum advantage for his community.

15. Attitude of the Pakistan Areas toward the Pakistan Idea.

It was remarked by Herbert Matthews in the New York Times of September 7, 1942 that "support for Pakistan is strongest in the provinces with Muslim minorities, and weakest in the Punjab and Bengal where there are Muslim majorities." It is significant that the strength of Muslim support for Pakistan should be in inverse ratio to the size of the Muslim community in any province. Conversely, to a very large degree, the opposition of Hindus in any province to Pakistan varies according to the percentage of Muslims in that province. Precisely, the matter comes to this: in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, where the Muslim majority is large, the Muslim League and Pakistan receive relatively small support. In the Punjab the support was considered moderate until the fall of 1942, but at that time Mr. Jinnah made a tour which showed considerable strength in support of the League and Pakistan, and seemed to gain an advantage over Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who opposed Pakistan. 25a/ In the United Provinces the support is very strong. Hindu opposition is strong in the Punjab, the United Provinces, and Bengal; but in the Madras province, where the number of Muslims is very small (6 percent), the idea of Pakistan is tolerated by the Hindus, and Mr. Rajagopalachariar, who was leader of the Congress party there, advocates marked concessions to the idea (see below in section 18). In every case the minority in a province is alarmed and vocal, while strong majorities are relatively undisturbed. In Bengal and Assam, where the numbers of Hindus and Muslims are roughly equal, the struggle is most intense and feeling is high on both sides.

In the following paragraphs statements appear concerning the various regions included in the proposals for Pakistan.

North-West Frontier Province. This is about 93 percent Muslim. In the 1937 elections for the provincial legislatures the Muslim League did not win a single seat. The ministry was set up by the Khuda-i-Khidmatgar ("Servants of God" but commonly called "Red Shirts") Party. This is composed of Muslims but is an affiliate of the Indian National Congress (see below in section 16), and the premier, a Muslim, is a strong Congress supporter. The present situation may now be different, that is, the position of the Muslim League is thought to have improved, and it is believed that some members of the legislature are now Muslim League adherents. A report from Sardar Aurangzeb Khan in the Muslim League newspaper Star of India estimated the strength of Abdul Ghaffar, leader of the Red Shirts, and then compared the relative strength in the provincial legislature of Congress and the Muslim League with the following results: of the legislature's 38 Muslim members (total membership, 50), 15 are Congressites, 8 are independents, and 15 are Muslim Leaguers. He thought that the independents leaned toward the League, but felt that the scale turned "slightly" toward Abdul Ghaffar Khan. 26/ This report, being in a pro-Muslim League newspaper and coming from a Muslim Leaguer, certainly gives the Muslim League every possible advantage.

Sind, which is 74 percent Muslim, returned no League candidates in the 1937 election. It had an independent Muslim premier, Mr. Allah Bakhsh, who was very anti-Pakistan and a long-avowed opponent of Mr. Jinnah and the League. He resigned in October 1942, and his successor, Sir Ghulam Hussein Hidayetullah, joined the League on October 23, 1942, thus possibly indicating an increase of League strength in Sind. Leaders of the Muslims there are seeking to reassure the politically conscious Hindu minority of goodwill and inter-communal cooperation.

The Punjab. Here the Muslims are about 57 percent of the population. In the 1937 elections the Muslim League won only a single seat of the 84 reserved for Muslims. The problem of the Sikhs in the Punjab would constitute one of the great political problems of Pakistan. The Muslim League professes to be confident of a majority of the Muslims in the province, but it fears a provincial vote or plebiscite. This seems clear in the reply made to Sir Stafford Cripps regarding the possibility of non-accession to the proposed Union:

> In the draft proposals no procedure has been laid down as to how the verdict of the Province is to be obtained in favor of or against accession to the Union, but in the letter dated April 2 from the Secretary of Sir Stafford Cripps addressed to the President of the All-India Muslim League it is stated that a province should reach the decision whether or not to stand out of the Union by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution to stand in. If the majority for accession to the Union is less than 60 percent, the minority will have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. In this connection it must be emphasized that in the provinces where the Muslims are in a majority, as in the case of the major provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, they are in a minority in the Legislative Assemblies...As regards the suggested plebiscite in the provinces in which the Mussalmans are in a majority...the procedure laid down is that reference shall be made to the whole adult population of the provinces and not to the Mussalmans alone; which is to deny them the inherent right to self-determination. 27/

The Muslim League now is thought to have strong influence in the Punjab, but does not entirely dominate the community. This fact was evident from the career of the late Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, premier of the Punjab, who steered a stormy course with the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah. Part of the time he was with the League, part of the time outside. He was the author of a "substitute" for Pakistan which would consist of coalition governments in the provinces, composed of Congress and League representatives. Mr. Jinnah has publicly repudiated this plan as not being of League origin (see above in this section).

Sir Sikandar's utterances have weight "in view of the position he holds in the League and as Premier of the Punjab." 28/

He never personally favored Pakistan but had to play ball with the League. He accepted Mr. Jinnah's dictatorship in the League when no great public issue was at stake. When he was accused of lacking due interest in Muslim affairs, he answered that he spoke at times "as a Muslim," at times "as a Premier." His parting from Mr. Jinnah came in 1941 when the government appointed four Muslim premiers to the National Defense Council. The announcement was so phrased as to make it appear that they had been appointed as Muslims, not as premiers. Mr. Jinnah felt that appointments representing the Muslims should have been made by the government only after consultation with him as spokesman for Indian Islam, and he ordered the premiers to resign the appointments. Sir Sikandar did so, but with reproaches of Mr. Jinnah and strong admonitions for support of the war effort. He afterwards continued to support the war at all costs and to oppose Pakistan.

Sir Sikandar aimed to resolve the communal problem. An agreement which he reached with the All-Parties Sikh Committee, reported June 1, 1942, stipulates that there is to be no public propaganda for or against Pakistan, nor any commitment of the government to any communal policy. The Sikhs are to have the right to teach Punjabi in the schools, and certain other specific concessions are made to them. Communal harmony is promised. 29/ However, Mr. Jinnah in the tour of the Punjab mentioned above succeeded in impairing this scheme. 29a/ The death of Sir Sikandar in December 1942 removed a strong opponent of Pakistan.

Bengal. Here the Muslim League in 1937 won 40 of the 117 legislative seats reserved for Muslims. The League's struggle for control of Bengal has been stormy, and Mr. Fazlul Huq, the premier of the province, alternately has been its strongest member and is now its strongest opponent. When he, like Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan in the Punjab, was ordered to resign from the Defense Council, he took

a long while to reply. Finally he did resign, but resigned at the same time from the Working Committee of the League, the letter of resignation violently attacking Mr. Jinnah and virtually declaring that his arbitrary rule was not to determine the destinies of the Muslims of Bengal. This was not the end. Mr. Fazlul Huq formed a Progressive Coalition Party, and in consequence was expelled from the League, partly for defying the Provincial Muslim League and partly for declining to join the Muslim League party in the Legislature. Essentially he had violated party discipline. The National Herald (Nehru's pro-Congress newspaper) feels Huq is a Leaguer with a "soft corner" for other communities, who cannot cater to the passion Jinnah's League has aroused. 30/

Assam. Assam gave 9 seats to League candidates in the 1937 elections out of 34 reserved for Muslims. Its ministry was set up by Congress and given a Muslim premier who does not endorse Pakistan.

Kashmir. Kashmir is mentioned in some of the proposals as part of Pakistan. The Muslims make up 77 percent of the population. The League has made relatively little headway in Kashmir, so far as any existing reports seem to indicate, and its strength there cannot be estimated accurately. There is a Kashmir branch of the All-India States Muslim League. This branch is still concerned with questions of posts and representation in the government of the states but joins the mother League in Pakistan demands.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdulla, a Muslim and leader of the nationalist movement in Kashmir, said in June 1941: "Muslim League politics cannot benefit Kashmir or British India. Muslims of Kashmir are prepared to appoint Nehru as sole arbitrator to settle the demands of minorities." 31/

## Tables

The following tables indicate the distribution of Muslim population throughout India, by provinces and states. In the case of the critical provinces of the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam, where the number of Muslims and Hindus is approximately equal, the distribution of population is also given according to administrative districts.

# POPULATION DATA PERTINENT TO PAKISTAN

(1931 Census)

## Provinces (and Indian States) with Muslim Majority

| | Total Population | Muslim Population | Percentage of Muslims |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baluchistan (British) | 463,508 | 405,309 | 87.4 |
| Baluchistan States | 405,109 | 392,782 | 97.0 |
| Bengal | 50,114,002 | 27,497,624 | 54.9 |
| Jammu and Kashmir | 3,646,243 | 2,817,636 | 77.3 |
| North-West Frontier | 2,425,076 | 2,227,303 | 91.8 |
| North-West Frontier Agencies | 46,451 | 23,086 | 49.7 |
| Punjab | 23,580,852 | 12,332,460 | 56.5 |
| Sind | 3,887,070 | 2,830,809 | 72.8 |
| "Pakistan" | 84,568,311 | 49,527,009 | 58.6 |

## Provinces (and Indian States) with Muslim Minority

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ajmer-Merwara | 560,292 | 97,133 | 17.3 |
| Assam | 8,622,251 | 2,755,914 | 32.0 |
| Assam States | 625,606 | 24,600 | 3.9 |
| Baroda | 2,443,007 | 182,630 | 7.5 |
| Bengal States | 973,336 | 312,476 | 32.1 |
| Bihar | 25,727,500 | 3,689,954 | 14.3 |
| Bihar and Orissa States | 4,652,007 | 19,516 | 4.2 |
| Bombay | 17,916,318 | 1,583,259 | 8.8 |
| Bombay States | 4,468,396 | 414,931 | 9.3 |
| Central Provinces and Berar | 15,507,723 | 682,854 | 4.4 |
| Central Provinces States | 2,483,214 | 23,254 | 9.4 |
| Chhota Nagpur | 6,643,934 | 450,373 | 6.8 |
| Cochin | 1,205,016 | 87,902 | 7.3 |
| Coorg | 163,327 | 13,777 | 8.4 |
| Delhi | 636,246 | 206,960 | 32.5 |
| Gwalior | 3,523,070 | 204,297 | 5.8 |
| Hyderabad | 14,436,148 | 1,534,666 | 10.6 |
| Madras | 46,740,107 | 3,305,937 | 7.1 |
| Madras States | 453,495 | 26,220 | 5.8 |
| Mysore | 6,557,302 | 398,628 | 6.1 |
| Orissa | 5,306,142 | 124,463 | 2.3 |
| Rajputana Agency | 11,225,712 | 1,069,325 | 9.5 |
| Sikkim | 109,808 | 104 | .1 |
| United Provinces | 48,408,763 | 7,181,927 | 14.8 |
| United Provinces States | 1,206,070 | 352,131 | 29.2 |
| Western India States Agency | 3,999,250 | 545,569 | 13.6 |
| "Hindustan" | 234,594,040 | 25,288,800 | 10.8 |

POPULATION OF PROVINCES WITH MUSLIM MAJORITY

(Available statistics from 1941 Census)

| | Muslims | Hindus | Sikhs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Punjab | 15,788,000 | 7,388,000 | 3,728,000 |
| Sind | 3,194,839 | 1,064,967 | |
| North-West Frontier Province | 2,788,797 | 180,321 | 57,939 |
| Bengal | 33,000,000 | 26,450,000 | |

POPULATION OF THE PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS - 1931

Districts where Muslims are above 50 percent

| | Total population | Muslim percentage | Hindu percentage | Sikh percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lahore | 1,378,570 | 59.2 | 18.8 | 17.7 |
| Sialkot | 979,617 | 62.2 | 21.1 | 9.7 |
| Gujranwala | 736,138 | 70.8 | 12.6 | 9.7 |
| Sheikhupura | 696,732 | 64.0 | 11.8 | 17.1 |
| Gujrat | 922,427 | 85.3 | 8.0 | 6.4 |
| Shahpur | 821,490 | 82.7 | 11.0 | 4.9 |
| Jhelum | 541,076 | 89.1 | 6.7 | 4.1 |
| Rawalpindi | 634,357 | 82.8 | 9.4 | 6.5 |
| Attock | 583,960 | 91.1 | 5.5 | 3.3 |
| Mianwali | 411,539 | 86.8 | 12.1 | 1.0 |
| Montgomery | 999,772 | 69.8 | 13.7 | 14.8 |
| Lyallpur | 1,151,351 | 62.6 | 15.1 | 18.4 |
| Jhang | 664,833 | 83.2 | 15.5 | 1.3 |
| Muzaffargarh | 591,375 | 86.8 | 12.3 | .9 |
| Dera Ghazi Khan | 491,044 | 88.2 | 11.7 | .2 |
| Biloch Trans-frontier Tract | 29,642 | 99.4 | .6 | |
| Multan | 1,174,900 | 80.3 | 15.5 | 3.4 |
| Gurdaspur | 970,898 | 50.8 | 26.4 | 18.4 |

THE PUNJAB - 1931

Districts where Muslims are below 50 percent

| | Total population | Muslim percentage | Hindu percentage | Sikh percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hissar | 899,479 | 28.2 | 64.9 | 6.1 |
| Rohtak | 805,621 | 17.1 | 81.4 | .1 |
| Gurgaon | 740,163 | 32.7 | 66.6 | .1 |
| Karnal | 852,614 | 30.5 | 66.9 | 2.0 |
| Ambala | 742,902 | 31.1 | 46.7 | 20.9 |
| Simla | 36,786 | 15.8 | 77.9 | 2.1 |
| Kangra | 801,312 | 5.1 | 93.9 | .3 |
| Hoshiarpur | 1,032,187 | 31.8 | 51.0 | 16.8 |
| Jullunder | 943,721 | 44.5 | 28.5 | 26.4 |
| Ludhiana | 672,494 | 35.0 | 17.9 | 46.5 |
| Ferozepur | 1,156,732 | 44.6 | 21.2 | 33.6 |
| Amritsar | 1,117,120 | 47.0 | 15.6 | 35.8 |

## POPULATION OF BENGAL BY DISTRICTS - 1931

| Districts where Muslims are above 50 percent | Total Population | Muslim Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Nadia | 1,529,632 | 61.8 |
| Murshidabad | 1,370,677 | 55.6 |
| Jessore | 1,671,164 | 62.0 |
| Rajshahi | 1,429,018 | 75.8 |
| Rangpur | 2,594,785 | 70.8 |
| Bogra | 1,086,419 | 83.4 |
| Pabna | 1,445,654 | 76.9 |
| Malda | 1,053,766 | 54.3 |
| Dacca | 3,432,577 | 66.8 |
| Mymensingh | 5,130,262 | 76.6 |
| Faridpur | 2,362,215 | 63.8 |
| Bakarganj | 2,939,050 | 71.6 |
| Tippera | 3,109,735 | 75.8 |
| Noakhali | 1,706,719 | 78.5 |
| Chittagong | 1,797,038 | 73.8 |
| Dinajpur | 1,755,432 | 50.5 |

| Districts where Muslims are below 50 percent | | |
|---|---|---|
| Burdwan | 1,575,699 | 18.6 |
| Birbhum | 947,554 | 26.7 |
| Bankura | 1,111,721 | 4.6 |
| Midnapore | 2,799,093 | 7.6 |
| Hooghly | 1,114,255 | 16.2 |
| Howrah | 1,098,867 | 21.3 |
| 24 Parganas | 2,713,874 | 33.7 |
| Calcutta | 1,196,734 | 26.0 |
| Khulna | 1,626,148 | 49.5 |
| Jalpaiguri | 983,357 | 24.0 |
| Darjiling | 319,635 | 2.6 |

POPULATION OF ASSAM BY DISTRICTS - 1941

Total Population - 10,930,388

| | Muslims | Hindus | Scheduled Castes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Districts of Muslim Majority** | | | |
| Sylhet | 1,892,117 | 785,004 | 364,510 |
| Goalpara | 468,924 | 282,789 | 23,434 |
| **Districts of Non-Muslim Majority** | | | |
| Kamrup | 367,522 | 637,457 | 59,092 |
| Nowgong | 250,113 | 229,137 | 59,214 |
| Darrang | 120,995 | 328,283 | 19,475 |
| Cochar | 232,950 | 173,855 | 51,961 |
| Sibsagar | 51,769 | 593,007 | 50,184 |
| Lakhimpur | 44,579 | 457,509 | 43,527 |
| Manipur and Kashi States | 29,562 | 327,462 | 339,137 |
| Garo Hills | 10,398 | 13,518 | |
| All Districts | 3,474,141 | 4,540,497 | 2,824,586 |

16. Muslim Opposition to Pakistan.

The Muslim League's claim to speak for all Indian Islam on the issue of Pakistan is disputed by a number of other Muslim organizations. None of these is equal in political influence to the League, and even their joint effect is inferior. There follows here an attempt to estimate Muslim strength ranged against the League on the issue of Pakistan.

The Azad Muslim Conferences. These furnish the most outspoken Muslim opposition to the League's scheme of Pakistan. They are composed of representatives of various Muslim organizations, especially the All-India Momin Conference, the Majlis-i-Ahrar, and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, which are described below. The most important of the Azad conferences was held in Delhi, April 27-28, 1940, presided over by Khan Allah Bakhsh, who until September 1942 was premier of Sind. Daily attendance is said to have been more than 50,000. All shades of Muslim opinion, except the League, were represented. Pakistan was rejected and a Constituent Assembly demanded.

An Azad Muslim Conference was held in the United Provinces at Lucknow, July 20-21, 1940. Despite rain, crowds of 8,000 attended the deliberations of the delegates, of whom there were perhaps as many as 500. At Kumbakonam in southern Madras, an Azad Muslim Conference (South Indian Anti-Separation Conference) was held on June 8, 1941. Processions, volunteers, "huge gatherings" were reported. Both at the United Provinces Conference and at the Kumbakonam meeting, the claim of the Muslim League to speak for Muslim India was vehemently denounced.

On March 1, 1942, a few days before it was announced that Cripps was going to India with new constitutional proposals, the All-India Azad Conference assembled again in Delhi with Allah Bakhsh in the chair. The conference adopted a resolution demanding immediate freedom

for India and the real transfer of power for the defense of the country to the representatives of the people. The resolution described as specious the plea of the British Government that the Muslim League, as represented by Mr. Jinnah, spoke for all Indian Muslims and characterized it as an indefensible subterfuge and a mark of British disinclination to part with power. Finally the resolution urged Mr. Jinnah to abandon communal activity and unite with the rest of India so as to speak with one voice for freedom. Another Azad conference was reported in the New York Times (November 10) to have started sessions on November 8, 1942, but it appears to have produced no important results.

The Muslim League, of course, resents such attacks. At the Pakistan Day celebration in Calcutta, March 23, 1942, the Muslim Leaguers passed a resolution condemning "the so-called 'Azad' Conference as a Congressite body of a few bogus and disgruntled renegades who are opposed to the political opinion of Muslim India. The Azad Conference has no status or position in the country at all, and cannot represent anyone." 32/

The Nationalist Muslim Party. This is the Muslim wing of the Indian National Congress. It is reported to have been formed in 1928 by Dr. Ansari and other Congress Muslims. Its platform is that of the Congress, and other Muslim groups have criticized it for insufficient attention to purely Muslim interests. The statement has been made that if Congress had directed its attentions to Muslim problems to the degree it has considered the Harijan groups (Depressed Classes), all Muslims would be in the Congress. Up to the outbreak of the present war, Congress followers claimed that the number of Muslims enrolled in the Congress was greater than the total membership of the Muslim League. The strength of the Congress Muslims today is difficult to estimate.

They form the leading group in the North-West Frontier Province, where they are known as the "Red Shirts" and have some influence in Sind and other provinces.

One of the Nationalist Muslims, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, is President of the Congress. The Maulana is a Muslim par excellence. He was born in Mecca (1888), educated in El-Azhar University in Cairo, and has attained eminence in the realms of theology, Muslim law, and literature. A quiet person, he is noted not for the spectacular, but for common sense and judgment. He is considered the flower of Islamic culture, in spite of his most liberal views regarding other religions and religious communities. His friendships are cosmopolitan and include some of the most noted men of the Islamic world, leaders of political and religious thought in the Near East. Perhaps largely through him the Near Eastern countries feel more at home in the thought of the Congress and are bewildered at the sectionalism of the Muslim League (see below, section 19). He is a non-fanatical, deeply religious person, holding the confidence of the Muslim divines (Ulema), who have repeatedly requested him to accept their headship, though he has always refused. He said in his Congress presidential address in 1940: "Indian Muslims have to answer one basic question: do we view the free India of the future with suspicion and distrust, or with courage and confidence? If we view it with fear and suspicion, then undoubtedly we have to follow a different path... I am a Muslim and proud of the fact. Islam's splendid traditions of 1300 years are my inheritance... It is my duty to protect them... I am proud of being an Indian, I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality... I am an essential element which has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim." 33/ This view is, of course, unequivocally anti-League.

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The Momins. The origin and nature of this organization is obscure. There is an All-India Momin Conference, with affiliated provincial conferences. Their leaders refer to the Momins as being among the "down-trodden" Muslim communities, who make up 80 million of the 90 million Muslims in India. Mr. Abdul Qaiyum Ansari, president of the Bihar Provincial Momin Conference, has declared that the total number of Momins is 45 millions, though he did not say what fraction of the Momins belong to the All-India Momin Conference. A newspaper, The Momin Gazette, is published at Cawnpore. The Momins consist mostly of agricultural workers and weavers. They protest against "class consciousness of the Muslim League" and demand the right to speak. They also demand that the people of the Indian States be given a voice in framing India's new constitution.

The leaders of the Momins have taken a prominent part in the Azad Muslim Conferences. They attack the Muslim League as "capitalistic-cum-communalistic;" they call for an independent, democratic India and support the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly to frame a new Indian constitution. They condemn the present social, economic, and political system as responsible for the misery of India and demand its end.

On March 3, 1942 the President of the Momin Conference cabled Mr. Churchill and others repudiating Mr. Jinnah's leadership. They support the "demand for the immediate recognition of India's freedom." 34/

In a communication (April 8, 1942) to Sir Stafford Cripps from the Committee of the All-Indian Momin Conference, the following items were laid down as the considered judgment of the Conference: "The unity of India is essential to the best interest of India, Muslims as well as Hindus... Communal dissensions and animosities as exist at present will completely disappear with the establishment of full self-

rule in India." An essential modification of the Cripps proposals was stated to be that "no province be allowed to keep out of the Union unless the scheme for one single Indian Union were given a fair trial for a full ten years." 35/

The Ahrars (plural of hurr--"free and independent man"). The Ahrar movement began as a left-wing agitation in the Punjab to free the Muslims of Kashmir from their Hindu ruler and the Brahman oligarchy. An Ahrar revolt in 1931 was suppressed with military force. Since then the Ahrars have come out for the independence of India and have cooperated with the Congress. At their political conference in June 1940--attended mostly by Muslim peasants--the Ahrars rejected both Pakistan and the leadership of the Muslim League. Their All-India leader, Sheikh Hissamuddin, was arrested in July 1941. They figured prominently in Azad Muslim conferences in northern India including that of March 1, 1942, but afterwards, on March 18, 1942, they severed this connection on the grounds that too little had been accomplished for them.

The Ahrars are a belligerently Sunni group and have frequently been in conflict with Shiahs. Their cry of madhe sahaba--"praise the companions" (of the first Khalif)--is a defiant acceptance of the first Caliphs, who are labelled by the Shiahs as unorthodox. Their emphasis is on jihad, or the necessary "war" a Muslim must wage on non-Muslim rule. Hence the deep anti-British feeling and anti-Hindu-rule activity in Kashmir. They make common cause with Congress only on the issue of independence, though they themselves have used non-cooperation as a method of fighting. If the Muslim League were primarily concerned with the independence of India, they would probably join it.

The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind. This is the Convocation of Muslim divines. It was founded in 1919 during the Khilafat agitation; its

chief center is Delhi. Politically, the Jamiat has supported the Congress demand for independence and has cooperated vigorously with the Congress, as in the civil disobedience campaign of 1930-34. As a Muslim body, however, it seeks to safeguard Muslim institutions and personal law. In 1933-34, the Jamiat claimed that the vast majority of the Ulema belonged to it and that it had about 200,000 dues-paying members. At that time the Jamiat told an English delegation that the majority of Muslims followed its lead. Dr. Ansari and Maulana A. K. Azad have been prominent among its leaders. The Jamiat participated in the All-India Azad Muslim Conferences of April 1940 and March 1942 and has figured in provincial and local efforts at Hindu-Muslim harmony and unity.

The importance of this group cannot easily be estimated. Its claim to leadership in religious affairs is not questioned, though the Muslim League indignantly demands that it leave the political field to politicians. Its power to hinder the League was indicated by the remark of the Secretary of the Assam Muslim League that the Muslims of India would come to one platform if the Jamiat would not transgress the Quranic command to advance Islam. He said, "They should at once eschew their present politics, the politics of the Congress, go to the Muslims to urge for Islamic unity and sacrifices, to call all to come under the flag of Pakistan and compel all to respond to the appeal of 'Qaid-i-Azam' (Jinnah) for funds and sacrifices to hasten the establishment of Pakistan." 36/

The following are extracts from a resolution passed by the Working Committee of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind on August 18, 1942:

> The freedom-loving patriots of India presented their just and legitimate demand to the British government in a manner which was very conciliatory and peaceful, and did not do anything up to last May which could harm the government in these times of trouble. The success of Britain and the defense of India depended solely on the complete independence of India. It would have been wise on the part of the British government, had they saved India

from destruction by announcing her freedom. In fact they would have paved their way to victory against Axis powers by such action. But it is regrettable that the British did not care a fig for it and they remained intoxicated as ever with the principles of imperialism. At last the lovers of freedom being assured by the circumstances reluctantly chalked out their way to their final goal which was based on mass civil disobedience and non-violence. Apparently there was no other way left for the realist statesmen and wise leaders of India. Even then the British government did not wake from their slumber and insisted on their obstinate attitude.

They not only refused to accept the just and legitimate Indian demand, but also took the highly despotic and hasty action by arresting the lovers of freedom and ignoring all its possible consequences. The inevitable result of such a short-sighted policy of the government came out in the shape of a country-wide conflagration. The hearts of Indians were filled with hatred and antagonism, and the feelings of the masses went out of their control. No sensible person or patriotic man can appreciate such actions as setting fire to property by cutting wires of communications or damaging buildings and offices, etc. The most deplorable aspect of these acts is the fact they have been committed in the name of Congress whose activities have been fundamentally based on a hard and fast principle of non-violence. But the whole responsibility rests with the government who took the hasty action which deprived the public of the leadership of their esteemed and influential leaders.

The Congress movement is nothing but peaceful and non-violent also in disobediance. This movement has been reluctantly started as the only and final remedy for the present state of things. No Indian who loves the freedom of India, has the defense of his country at heart, and craves for the power to fight the foreign invaders, can differ from this resolution. 37/

The Shiahs. The Shiahs are non-orthodox, as contrasted with the orthodox Sunnis, and constitute only 8 percent of the Indian Muslims (see above in section 4). The Muslim League membership is chiefly Sunni; Congress supporters have said that the Shiahs refuse to work with the Muslim League. Evidence one way or the other is scarce. At the All-India Shiah Political Conference in the winter of 1939-40, the delegates voted to dissociate the Conference both from the Congress and from the Muslim League. It may be relevant that during the debate on this issue, Mr. Jaffar Hussain, General Secretary of the Conference, withdrew from the discussion because in his opinion it was harmful for the Shiah Community to keep itself aloof from the Congress. Another authority says the Shiahs "have disowned the Muslim League and support Congress." 38/

In April 1942 the Working Committee of the All-India Shiah Political Conference passed a rather ambiguous resolution reiterating its National standpoint and unequivocally declaring that the Shiah Community stands for the independence and political advancement of the country: "Any movement or scheme which was put forward from any platform whatever, whether Muslim (League?) or non-Muslim (Hindu Mahasabha?), and which had the effect of impeding the political progress of the country and calculated to impair its larger interests, could not be countenanced by the conference."

It is impossible to estimate the exact strength of the Shiahs, for the 1931 census (the latest one complete) gives no returns for sects in the most influential Shiah centers in the United Provinces. Their number was estimated at 5,500,000 in 1925. 39/ The Shiahs' own estimate of 20 percent of the Muslims in India would give them 19,000,000, which is obviously an exaggeration. Titus says they are "certainly less than 10 percent," 40/ and the current figure, therefore, based upon the 1921 figure of 8 percent would be about 7,500,000.

The Ahmadiyyas. The Ahmadiyyas, numbering about 100,000, are followers of the Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908). He claimed to be the Mahdi (the "directed one," who is come to lead) of the Muslims, an avatar (divine incarnation) for the Hindus, the second coming of the Christ for the Christians, the Messiah of the Jews--in short, the embodiment of all the religious aspirations of the great religious groups. The warfare which orthodox Islam has considered to be a function of the Mahdi, Ghulam Ahmad described as one of the spirit. He taught "loyalty to the British government and abstention from the political activities of the All-India Muslim League." 41/ The Ahmadiyyas traditionally fight all other Muslims as well as Christians and Hindus and carry on a work of proseletyzing. They are interested

primarily in religion rather than politics. Today, they are split into the orthodox group, with headquarters at Qadian (Punjab), and the unorthodox, who are centered in Lahore. The most distinguished member of the community was Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the poet, who belonged to the progressive Lahore group.

There are two solutions of the problem of Hindu-Muslim relations according to the Qadiani Ahmadiyyas: "(1) Cultural and spiritual conquest of one community by the other by legitimate and peaceful means which will automatically lead to economic and political adjustments," or (2) Pakistan. "The Ahmadiyyas prefer the former solution and work toward it." 42/ A proposal for a very loose form of association among autonomous provinces is suggested by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a member of the Qadiani Ahmadiyya. 42a/ The means they use for this, as for all their propaganda work, is missionary activity, which they pursue both at home and abroad.

Khuda-i-Khidmatgar ("Servants of God"), known as "Red Shirts." This party grew up in 1929-30 out of the dissatisfaction with the operations being conducted by the Simon Commission. Their leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, modeled his activities largely on those of Gandhi and advocated non-violent resistance as the method of revolt. This was a strange doctrine for the bloody and tumultuous border, but it had marked success and the party grew to great numbers. Though its activities were not always devoid of violence, it gave its dogma wide range, and Abdul Ghaffar Khan was known as "the Frontier Gandhi," while his party was an affiliate of the Congress. The membership is Muslim and the milieu of the party is the North-West Frontier Province, which figures conspicuously in all Pakistan schemes.

There is no reason to think that Muslim League inroads in recent years have destroyed the Red Shirts' position of supremacy. In

the 1937 elections they swept the whole North-West Frontier Province, but they have probably lost ground to the League since, though not decisively. The Red Shirts' ministry resigned in November 1939, along with the Congress ministries in other provinces, in protest against the action of the Government of India, which had exercised its constitutional right to declare India in the war without consulting the Legislative Assembly. In 1940 the premier, Dr. Khan Sahib, brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was one of many who were imprisoned for adopting satyagraha (non-violent resistance) against the Government of India on the failure of the British to promise India unconditional independence after the war. He was released in December 1941.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan is a "good" Muslim, that is, he observes Muslim practice, but members of the Muslim League complain that he has "betrayed his nation" in trafficking with Hindus in the Congress. He disclaims the charge on the ground that the Congress is not communal but is All-Indian, being composed of "Hindus, Jews, Sikhs, Parsis, and Muslims."

When independence is established it will then be discovered how communal the Khuda-i-Khidmatgars are, but at the moment they oppose Pakistan, the Muslim League, and Mr. Jinnah: "There is no support in the North-West of India for a Muslim state. Both the educated Muslims and the villagers are against the idea." 43/ There is an accusation that Ghaffar Khan wants a "Pathanistan" carved out for his people, the Pathans, but the truth of the charge cannot be tested.

Under the leadership of the Khuda-i-Khidmatgars and with Congress inspiration, much social and religious reform has been undertaken. At a public meeting held in Bombay on September 9, Abdul Ghaffar Khan announced that if "not only Pakistan but all of India is

handed to the Muslim League, we will not begrudge it if the British Government declares us a free nation." This sentiment corresponds with one expressed by many prominent Congress members. It is not meant to be pro-Muslim League, but to indicate the non-communal character of those professing it, who would sacrifice all to gain freedom.

In summary it appears that the Muslim League outweighs in influence the organized groups opposing it on the Pakistan issue, but it by no means represents all the Indian Muslim community. The other groups are strong enough to come jointly only a little distance short of the League.

Some Eminent Indian Muslims Opposed to Pakistan.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938). Poet, religious philosopher, the outstanding Indian Muslim of the last generation. He launched the Pakistan idea officially. Later he wrote to Mr. Edward Thompson that he soon lost his love for the idea, as he realized it would be "disastrous to the British government, disastrous to the people of India, disastrous to the Hindus, disastrous to my own community." 44/ Sir Muhammad's political interest centered in Turkish reforms and secularization of political life, of which he highly approved. 45/

The late Sir Akbar Hydari (1869-1942). The brilliant Premier of the Nizam's Dominions, a personality revered and honored, pictures the evolution of a national culture independent of religion and language. He is against Pakistan. 46/

Sir Mirza Ismail, astute former Premier of Mysore, now premier of Jaipur, whose regime under a Hindu ruler is the living testimony to the political result of practical Hindu-Muslim amity, says, "A communal movement is inimical to the true interests of the

country only to the extent that it encourages the growth of exclusive or violent communal loyalty or a militant particularist spirit. It is good if it furthers the interests of all, and stimulates brotherhood. Differences are negligible beside the bonds that unite them." 47/

Begum Shah Nawaz, eminent champion of Indian Womanhood. The only woman appointed to the Viceroy's Defense Council, she refused to obey Mr. Jinnah's order to resign, as did also Sir Sultan Ahmed. Both were suspended from the Muslim League for five years for insubordination.

The five Muslim provincial premiers (out of the total of 11) are all opposed to Pakistan. These are:

Sir Sikander Hyat Khan of the Punjab (died December 1942)
Mr. Fazlul Huq of Bengal
Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh of Sind (resigned October 1942)
Mr. Saadullah of Assam
Dr. Khan Sahib of the North-West Frontier Province

17. Non-Muslim Opposition to Pakistan.

The Hindu Mahasabha. This is the natural enemy of the Muslim League. Intensely communal and intensely nationalistic, it numbers among its leaders some of the colorful revolutionaries of a generation ago, including especially such personalities as the President, Mr. Veer Savarkar, who was once an "international incident," and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University and spokesman for Brahmanical orthodoxy. Its objects are to organize and consolidate Hindu society and to protect and promote Hindu interests. It aims at reform and at missionary promotion of Hinduism, and constitutes a direct threat, political and religious, to Islamic interests.

The Mahasabha stands for a united India as a Hindu India. It speaks in resolutions of the "fantastic communal demands put forward by the Muslim League." 48/ It believes the British back the Pakistan scheme. Dr. Moonje, working President and leader of the Mahasabha and Finance Minister of Bengal, on July 3, 1942 said of Pakistan: "It is a complete picture of an Anglo-Muslim pact, which was an object of the Cripps Mission. At present, administration means war administration, which is a monopoly of the Anglo-Muslim clique.... After the war, with England's victory, will come...the final stage.... India will be partitioned and Pakistan established with or without Mr. Rajagopalachariar's and the Congress Party's consent." 49/

The Mahasabha organized a congress of workers to take steps to mobilize opinion against Pakistan and has celebrated Anti-Pakistan Days in Amraoti, Poona, and elsewhere.

The Indian National Congress. The Congress will not concede that Pakistan is the demand of the Muslims of India. In summing up the

attitude of Congress toward the League position, Mr. J. B. Kripalani writes:

> Gandhiji has made it clear that he will allow free choice to Muslims to remain inside or outside the Indian union or federation, in a free India. He does not talk of the League, but of the Muslim community. Whatever be the influence of the League, Gandhiji does not consider the League identical with the Muslim community. Many influential Muslims think likewise. If this position that the League and the community are one is conceded, it means that the Muslims outside the League, the Congress and National Muslims, the Momins, the Shiahs, the Ahrars, and the members of the Jamiat are outside the Muslim community and the League is the only and the sole representative of that community. Whom, then, does the Congress represent? Virtually only the Hindus. This is the position taken by Mr. Jinnah and which has been repudiated by Congress. On this point all negotiations of the past have broken down.... In a free India, if the Muslim community, and not the League, wants Pakistan, it will not merely use a word but carefully define it and keep before the Indian public its full significance and content. It is quite possible that when this is done there may be little to demand and little to concede. Today by conceding Pakistan beforehand, you give a fillip to a slogan that has already excited communal passions and hatred. 50/

The Sikh All-Parties Committee. The Sikhs, as a minority community in the Punjab, have a relation to the Muslims in that province similar to that of the Muslims toward the Hindus in all India. The Sikhs claim that the Muslims treat them there in the way in which the Muslims claim the Hindus treat them elsewhere. The case of the Sikhs is therefore sometimes regarded as the touchstone of Muslim sincerity on the whole communal issue. "What is sauce for the Sikh gander is evidently not, in Mr. Jinnah's estimation, sauce for the Muslim goose." 51/ Long ago the "political tyranny" of Muslim Mughul Emperors (17th century) converted a pacific group of disciples (Sikhs) of the gentle Nanak into a militant lionlike (Singh) commonwealth; constant communal friction has kept the memory fresh. The Sikh All-Parties Committee wrote Sir Stafford Cripps (March 31, 1942): "...from the point of view of (1) India's integrity, and (2) the Sikh position, we find them [the Cripps proposals] unacceptable because; (1) instead of maintaining

and strengthening the integrity of India, specific provision has been made for the separation of Provinces and the constitution of Pakistan, and (2) the cause of the Sikh community has been lamentably betrayed."

The Punjab as a whole returns a Muslim majority. The Sikhs and the Hindus, however, can claim together the districts east of the Sutlej river (see tables at end of section 15). The Sikhs propose a new delimitation of the provincial boundaries of the Punjab, so as to create a new province comprising the Ambala and Jullundur districts, with the Amritsar, Gurudaspur, and Lahore districts. The River Ravi then would divide the present Punjab into two provinces, each having a greater degree of cultural, linguistic, and political homogeneity than the present whole. The Akali section of the Sikh community, which carries the torch of religious purity for Sikhism, is the militant wing of the movement. In the long struggle of both Sikhs and Hindus against Islam, the two religions have been brought ever closer together, each being fearful of renewed rule by the ancient oppressor.

The Sikhs stand today for national unity. They oppose "vivisection"--if Pakistan becomes a fact they will be as insistent upon their communal rights as are the Muslims now.

As to the "betrayal" of the Sikhs by the British, they have repeatedly expressed their disappointment that their loyalty has been rewarded by preferential treatment accorded their traditional enemies, the Muslims.

The Sikhs list the following important facts:

1. They are a distinct community.
2. In the Punjab they are 13.5 percent of the population, but pay 25 percent of the taxes.
3. They maintain 400 schools and 4 colleges, open to all communities.
4. Percentage of literacy higher than that of any other community in the Punjab.

5. There were 32,500 Sikhs in the Indian Army at the outbreak of the first world war, and they furnished 89,000 recruits in addition.

6. The Sikhs were deeply disappointed with the communal electoral "awards" of 1932.

7. They believe in a wide measure of provincial autonomy, but --

8. They will not submit to the domination of a community which is bent on breaking the unity of India. 52/

They are firm in their demands and insist that they will fight if Pakistan is granted: "We want Swaraj. We do not want Sikh rule and we shall oppose any communal or foreign rule. If Muslims of the Muslim League mentality will make an effort to establish their rule they will have to cross an ocean of Sikh blood." 53/ Mr. Jinnah, however, on November 16, 1942, rejected any separation of the Sikhs from the Punjab. 53a/

The National Liberal Federation. This is composed of leaders only, with no mass following. They represent the old moderate point of view, and their roster contains such names as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Rt. Hon. Mukund Ramrao Jayakar, Dr. R. P. Paranjpye, the present president, and others. They see in Pakistan the possible ruin of a lifetime of effort toward constitutional development and the end of Indian independent democracy. They stand outside the communal organizations and Congress and are thought by modern Congress Party members to be anachronistic, because their nationalism is of the cautious, conciliatory, long-range variety, smacking of the early days of the Indian National Congress.

In a memorandum on the Cripps proposals, the Liberals remark: "The creation of more than one Union, howsoever consistent in theory with the principle of self-determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests of the country and its integrity and security."

They concede, however, that the creation of a separate Dominion might be tried experimentally provided the proposal for such a Dominion should get a majority of 65 percent in the provincial legislatures. As the Muslim provinces are now constituted, this would be impossible in any of them. 54/

Mr. Jayakar, a prominent member of the Liberal Federation, has said: "Pakistan looks like a smoke-screen behind which efforts are perhaps being made both in England and in India to...devise a constitution far removed from Democratic principles." 55/ In consequence, the "Sapru Conference" of the Liberal Federation is called "a new enemy of the League." 56/

The Iran League. This is concerned with the interests of the Parsis, who fled Iran during the Muslim conquest, determined to retain in its purity their Zoroastrian faith. They have a nostalgic interest in all that happens in Iran, and in October 1941 vigorously protested the manner of the military occupation of Iran by the British. The Iran League is not important politically, except that the community it represents hold vast and strategic financial and industrial interests. It is opposed to any national rule, Muslim or otherwise, as "immature."

Leftist Organizations: The Indian Communist Party and The National Democratic Union stand for the unity and integrity of India. They see no "communities" except those created by economic status and ideologies. The Communist Party is launching a "campaign for All-India National Unity, for all-out national resistance, for unity of the Congress and the Muslim League, and for a united demand for a National Government." 57/

18. Concessions to the Pakistan Idea.

Reluctant concessions from opponents are being made to the Pakistan idea in the interests of communal peace, national aspirations, and the prosecution of the war. These concessions are usually made on the ground that it is futile to hold out against that which will ultimately have to come. It is "the lesser of two evils;" "we may as well give it now as later after much bitterness;" "Hindus underestimate Muslim power." Concession is of many varieties. All those who offer the concession want only one thing at bottom, namely unity in India, even though it is, paradoxically, a unity on the thesis that India must divide.

Mr. Chakravarti Rajagopalachariar's Proposals.

Mr. Rajagopalachariar (or Rajagopalachari) is one-time leader of the Congress Party in Madras, and until May 1942 was a member of the Working Committee of the All-India National Congress. On April 23, 1942, inspired by the Japanese approach to the shores of India, the Madras Legislature Congress Party, at his initiative, passed by a majority of 37 to 6 two resolutions before a hall packed with leaders of Madras politics. The first resolution was as follows:

> "The Madras Legislature Congress Party notes with deep regret that the attempts to establish a national government for India to enable her to face the problems arising out of the present grave situation have failed, and that as a result of this, nationalist India has been placed in a dilemma. It is impossible for the people to think in terms of neutrality or passivity during an invasion by an enemy power. Neither is it practicable to organize any effective defense independently and uncoordinated with the defense measures of the Government.
>
> "It is absolutely and urgently necessary in the best interests of the country at this hour of peril to do all that the Congress can possibly do to remove every obstacle in the way of establishment of a national administration to face the present situation; and therefore, inasmuch as the Muslim League has insisted on the recognition of the right of separation of certain areas from united India upon the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of such areas as a condition precedent for a united national action at this moment of grave national danger, this party is of the opinion and recommends to the All-India Congress Committee that to sacrifice the chances

of a formation of a national government at this grave crisis for the doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the unity of India is a most unwise policy and that it has become necessary to choose the lesser evil and acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation should the same be persisted in when the time comes for framing a constitution for India, and thereby remove all doubts and fears in this regard, and to invite the Muslim League for a consultation for the purpose of arriving at an agreement and securing the installation of a National Government to meet the present emergency."

The second resolution was as follows:

"Whereas the Province of Madras is seriously threatened with enemy invasion and practically all the districts are under daily expectation of bombardment and enemy landings, and life is consequently subjected to growing dislocation all around; whereas it is suicidal for the present, and disastrous for the future, for the people's elected representatives to remain passive and let the people suffer under these conditions and also submit to aggression without participation in the defense of the motherland; and whereas participation in defense is practicable only if the people are armed and organized to some extent and inspired for sacrifice; the Madras Legislature Congress Party voices the general feeling in this part of the country that there should be at this critical juncture a popular government in this province doing its utmost to secure the requisite conditions for the people to play their part.

"The Party is of the opinion further that to facilitate united and effective action in this regard by such a popular government, the Muslim League should be invited to participate in it. This party, therefore, request the All-India Congress Committee to permit this party to take steps to this end, notwithstanding the all India policy followed by the Congress."

The first resolution met resounding defeat at the hands of the All-India Congress Committee in May--the second was not even presented. Chakravarti Rajagopalachariar, author of the "Madras apostasy," resigned from the Working Committee to tour and propagandize in favor of a semblance of union, even though with acceptance of the "lesser evil" of communal demands. He seems to hold hope that there will be a new attitude and the demand for Pakistan will not be "persisting." Sir Frederic Whyte, first speaker of the Indian Legislative Assembly, expresses the hope that Rajagopalachariar will find the way of "yoking the moral power of Indian Nationalism to the War Chariot of the United Nations." 58/

Mr. Rajagopalachariar gives as his reasons for compromising on the Pakistan issue: "I want a National army, for which I want a National government, and I want a National front to secure a National government. The National front involves primarily a settlement with the Muslim League." 59/

Some who are lukewarm to his scheme are ready to see it tried. The Hon. Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, Minister of Education, Industries, Labour, Forest, and Rural Reconstruction in the government of Sind, remarks: "I believe that Pakistan is not practicable, but I believe that Mr. Rajagopalachariar's views...may be tried to achieve the ultimate object of freedom...I am certain that the Muslim League leaders will themselves give up the idea of dividing India into 'stans'...I think the Madras leader will be able to get good response from Congressmen, both Hindus and Muslims, and Azad Muslims."

Much emotion has been aroused by Rajagopalachariar's proposal. His supporters and opponents alike emphasize the need for unity; they differ only on how it is to be achieved. Cries of "Congress-League settlement ki jai" ("Victory to Congress-League settlement") are numerous and may eventually have significance. 60/ Many Muslims, including some Congress Muslims, lend it hearty support. Muslim papers give it much space and hail Mr. Rajagopalachariar as one of their own.

Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar and the Depressed Classes. It is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion concerning the attitude of the political group representing the interests of the Depressed Classes, except by inference.

This group, under the leadership of Mr. M. C. Rajah and Dr. Ambedkar, stated to Sir Stafford Cripps that any possibility of Hindu control would not be welcomed by them. They are, therefore, tacitly lined up with "partition" and partitionist groups and must necessarily concede Pakistan to the Muslim League.

This is certainly the attitude of Dr. Ambedkar, who, in his book Thoughts on Pakistan (1941), has admitted that Pakistan is not preposterous or unthinkable. He has sought to analyze the idea and proposes a partition based on population areas rather than on existing Provincial boundaries. Under this plan Pakistan would not include certain areas of the Punjab. It would in the northeastern part of India include only the middle portion of the Bengal-Assam area. One of the 110 arches erected at the triumphal entry of Mr. Jinnah into Allahabad on April 3, 1942 for a meeting of the Muslim League was in honor of Dr. Ambedkar.

Sir Firozkhan Noon's Five-Dominion Proposal. A new division of India into five Dominions was proposed by Sir Firozkhan Noon, a Muslim and Defense Member of the Viceroy's Council, in an address delivered August 24, 1942 at the Aligarh University. It proposed five separate Dominions with a loose federation, as follows: (1) Bengal and Assam; (2) The Central Provinces, the United Provinces, and Behar; (3) Madras; (4) Bombay; and (5) the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

Muslim League reactions to this proposal may be gauged from confidential statements made by the Secretary of the League to an American consular officer. First of all the plan is labelled worthless, though both areas of the Muslim League's scheme are accorded status as Dominions. There is, however, the embarrassment that Pakistan would be divided in two and would have three Hindustans to deal with rather than one. The League stands opposed to federation in principle, even a federation of Dominions or of highly autonomous provinces. The secretary of the League said that only under one condition would the League consider such a plan--that there be military and political numerical equality with Hindus in the Central Administration. In making this suggestion, he was aware that neither the Hindus

as such nor the Congress would accept it. The plan includes a Tariff and Currency Union of these Dominions, which would at least relieve Pakistan of the embarrassment of being a deficit area.61/

Cripps Proposals. The concession to the Pakistan idea contained in the Cripps proposals have been outlined in Section I. On December 16, 1942 the Viceroy made a speech at Calcutta in which he urged unity of the Indian parties so that India should not try to speak with "two voices" and deplored the disunity. This speech was taken by Jinnah, Rajagopalachariar, and Ambedkar to be a repudiation of the Pakistan proposal which had been indirectly accepted in the Cripps proposals. Some Indian comment seemed to think that it was also an effort to prevent a possible agreement among Indian groups under the impetus of negotiations among Jinnah, Rajagopalachariar and others.61a/

## THE MUSLIM WORLD AND PAKISTAN

19. Pan-Islamism and India.

It is frequently thought that the treatment of the Muslims in India is a matter of concern to the rest of the Muslim world. If the Muslims in India are dissatisfied, their dissatisfaction will affect Muslims elsewhere, the position of the British in the Near East especially will be prejudiced. It is proposed to examine here the relation of Indian problems to Pan-Islamism and endeavor to ascertain the current feeling toward India in important Muslim countries.

It may be said at the start that the Indian Muslim, on the whole, feels himself closely related to the rest of the Muslim world. He concerned himself with the Khilafat question after World War I. Toward the present war the Muslim League was reluctant to adopt any opinion until it could "get in touch with Islamic countries and determine their views."62/ At almost everyone of its sessions the League passes a resolution on the Palestinian situation. When the British occupied Iran during this war, the League protested.63/ The question, however, is that of the extent to which the rest of the Muslim world has a reciprocal interest in Indian Islam.

Pan-Islamism. The principle that all Muslims are brothers is often confused with the notion of prevailing solidarity in the Muslim World. The facts do not bear out this notion. Religious chauvinism does not flourish in conjunction with religious apathy such as had pervaded Islam for many hundreds of years, down into the 18th century.64/ Since then Islam has undergone a religious revival which was due, rather paradoxically, to the impact of Western ideals. But the main reasons for this revival have been political and cultural. European ideas of freedom and democracy have stimulated in the East an

opposition to the pressure by the colonizing powers. Since Islam was the only unifying influence which the colonized territories from Morocco and Algeria to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies had in common, progressive elements in Islamic territories sought added strength in a recourse to the common spiritual heritage.65/ But the preaching of Pan-Islamic theories was not confined to the progressives. The same tendency was utilized by the reactionary Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid II (reigned from 1876 until deposed in 1908) for the purpose of reviving the Caliphate as a stimulant to the waning Ottoman Empire. This was plainly a political move.66/ Hardly less utilitarian, but not nearly so effective, was the support of the Caliphate movement by the British Government of India. Aimed originally at establishing a common Islamic front against Russia, it was turned presently by Abdul Hamid into an instrument of anti-British propaganda.67/ It is clear that the Pan-Islamism of the Arab progressives, Abdul Hamid, and the India Office were three entirely different things. They were mutually antagonistic political tendencies.

Nationalism versus Pan-Islamism. The dominant movement in the Islamic countries today is nationalism. It has been gaining momentum steadily since the latter half of the nineteenth century.68/ The religious undercurrent is still ready to hand and is apt to get out of hand every so often.69/ But where nationalism and Pan-Islamism happen to be in conflict it is the secular motive that prevails invariably. This is shown by:

(a) The Arab rebellion against the Turkish Caliph during the first World War. The Muslims who took part in it felt that "it was more pleasing to Allah to fight the Turk for freedom than to heed the Caliph's call to a Holy War."70/

(b) The abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish nationalists on March 3, 1924, when Mustafa Kemal proclaimed "the deliverance of politics from religious prejudices."71/

(c) The cooperation of non-Muslims with Muslims against Western political pressure, as when the Copts combine with the Egyptian nationalists,72/ or the Christian Arabs of Palestine with the local Muslims in opposition to Zionism.

(d) The long series of bloody uprisings against European authority: In Egypt (since 1919); the Iraq rebellion (1920); the Druze War (1925-6); the Moroccan War (1925-6), etc. The number of such uprisings since the end of the first World War, after the local aspirations to independence had been diregarded, is a forceful reminder of the strength and depth of the nationalist movement in the lands of Islam.

Countering Moves by the Westerners. The favorite counter move of the Western Powers has been to stimulate religious and ethnic minorities. This helps to explain the establishment of the Lebanese and Alawiya republics in Syria by the French; the attention paid the Iraqi Kurds by the British; the introduction of new minorities in Iraq in the Nestorians and Chaldeans; the use of Armenian and Circassian mercenaries in Syria and of the Assyrian levies in Iraq; and the virtual aloofness of the Palestine government in the Arab-Zionist controversy. The shortsightedness of this policy is stressed by so profound and essentially pro-British a student of Eastern affairs as Arnold J. Toynbee.73/

It was essentially in line with the same policy that the British government in India encouraged the Ottoman pretensions of Abdul Hamid. In fact, so committed was the Indian government to this course of action that it opposed the Arab nationalist rebellion against Turkey during the first World War. Eventually the "Anglo-Indian school" lost out to the "Anglo-Egyptian school" which backed the Arab uprising under the Sherif of Mecca, Huseyn.74/ While the British Foreign Office paid Huseyn a subvention of £200,000 a month,

the Indian Office continued, nevertheless, to pay the more modest sum of £5,000 a month to Huseyn's political opponent, Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd. 75/ Eventually the two Arab rulers came to grips and some of their battles were fought "at a time when both combatants were receiving gold and arms from the British and when their common patron was engaged at the Peace Conference of Paris in an attempt to restore peace to the world." 76/

Indian Muslims and the rest of Islam. It has been said of the Indian Muslims that their temper and opinion have been in general different from, and out of touch with, the temper and opinion of most Muslims. 77/ This is to be ascribed to the "minority complex" of the Indian Muslims, "the deep underlying threat of submergence." 78/ It is true that the relation of Muslims to Hindus could shift temporarily from the footing of rivalry to that of cooperation and that the leaders of the younger generation of Muslims have favored the Hindu political aspirations. 79/ In general, however, the traditional policy of the Indian Muslims has been to seek a rallying point outside the frontiers of India where Muslims constitute a national majority. This policy, necessarily of a religious character, came to revolve around the Indian Khilafat Conference. The Ottoman Caliphate opportunely filled the bill for a time. But at the very moment when the Indian Muslims were turning to the Ottoman Caliphate with a new fervor, that institution was on the point of being abolished. 80/

The all but frantic defensive attitude of the Indian Muslims in urging the importance of religion upon the rest of the Islamic world found little sympathy among their co-religionists. On the contrary, it succeeded now and then in arousing resentment. When the Agha Khan and Sayyid Amir Ali championed the cause of the Turks in the Anatolian War (1919-22) their efforts brought them no thanks from Great Britain. After the Turks had emerged victorious these two gentlemen proceeded to show their concern with regard to the Caliphate which

was now in danger from the Turks themselves. But the letter which they addressed on this subject to Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister of Turkey, brought forth insinuations at Ankara that the writers were no better than agents of Britain.81/ The fact that the rest of the Islamic world was either indifferent on the question of the Caliphate, or at worst neutral, made the position of the well-meaning Indian Muslims all the more ludicrous.

The rebuff at the hands of the Turks did not deter the Khilafat Conference from seeking aid elsewhere. After the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turks on March 3, 1924, Huseyn of Hejaz proclaimed himself Caliph. Once again, most of the Muslim World proved indifferent or neutral in the matter. Not so the Indian Muslims. Since Huseyn was also head of the Arab nationalist movement, this fact alone rendered him unfit as Caliph in the eyes of the Khilafat Conference. They turned, accordingly, to Huseyn's opponent, Ibn Sa'ud. But when they entered into a public controversy with the Hejazi Government, the Egyptian press, which was essentially neutral, took the view that the Indians had interfered unwarrantably in the affairs of an independent government.82/ Eventually the Indians fell out with Ibn Sa'ud (after the failure of the Pan-Islamic Conference in Mecca in June 1926), largely because they could not reconcile themselves to the fact that the dominant idea in the Near East was not Pan-Islamism but nationalism 83/

The will to national self-determination and independence in the lands of Islam far outweighs today the feeling of religious solidarity. Those Indian Muslims who for reasons of their own seek to place religion above national aspirations have not found sympathy for their views among the Islamic nations of the Near East. On several occasions they have met, instead, with emphatic rebuffs.

It would seem, therefore, that Great Britain is not likely to antagonize the rest of the Islamic World by granting independence

to a united India against the wishes of certain elements among the Indian Muslims. To be sure, the British are apt to be criticized for whatever they do. To the extent that the Muslims of the Near East are nationalists they are necessarily also anti-British. For the same reason they are inclined to favor the current enemies of Great Britain and look upon the Axis as the more remote evil. Those who look upon England as the immediate opponent would probably champion the Indian nationalist cause when the British government is strongly at variance with the demands of the Congress as chief nationalist party, but would promptly raise the religious issue as soon as its demands have been heeded. From propagandists like the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem one could scarcely expect a less opportunistic attitude. In view of the repeatedly attested sympathy for nationalism among the Muslims, however, (as evidenced recently on behalf of the Iranians after the occupation of their country by England and Russia) England stands to gain rather than to lose in the eyes of other Muslims by granting India her independence. An independent united India, regardless of religious differences, could well prove an earnest of better things to come in the various lands of the Near East.

20. The Muslim Countries and the Current Indian Crisis.

Afghanistan. There seems still to lurk in the Afghan official mind memory of the time when what is proposed as Pakistan (Northwest Zone) comprised the Indus provinces of Mahmud of Ghazni. Mr. Rahmat Ali's ideal Pakistan scheme in its original form included Afghanistan If India were to be nationalized, particularly under predominatly Hindu control, no commitments now held by Afghanistan to the (British) government of India would be considered binding. It is possible that a resurgence of nationalist demands on the part of Afghanistan for the border areas would make difficulties for an Indian government.

At present, Afghanistan steers a ticklish course between the British on the one hand and fellow-Muslims on the Indian borders and the Muslim League on the other. India is Afghanistan's outlet to the West. The king was assisted to power by the Waziris in 1929--hence he owes a political debt to the Faqir of Ipi, who is a perpetual nuisance to the British. The Waziri tribes are excellent material for Nazi anti-British propaganda and may be inclined to look upon the king as a stooge of the British.

The Afghans have decidedly mixed feelings about Germans, Russians, and British. They may have some reasons for desiring the victory of the United Nations.83a/ They have confidence in the continued resistance of the Russians but think British resistance in India is weak. They believe a Japanese-dominated India would mean a Hindu-dominated India. They even think the "heathen" Japanese and the "heathen" Gandhi may be bound in a Buddhist-Hindu pact.

Hence they want a change of United Nations policy in the Near and Middle East to prevent further penetration--and before cooperation is extended, they want assurance as to what is going to happen to the Muslims of India. In this they would stand with the Muslim League.

Axis propaganda has worked unsuccessfully with Pan-Arab propaganda but keeps on sounding the anti-British nationalist note, with vague Pan-Muslim coloring.84/

Iraq. There is no great popular stir in Iraq over the Indian situation. What there is seems to be on the part of the masses who are generally anti-British, although a prejudice against Indians themselves cools any real enthusiasm. The Nazis have been unable to turn the Indian situation to propaganda purposes.85/

The Iraqis recognize that India is the real stronghold against the imperial ambitions of "heathen" Japanese. They therefore approve strong repressive measures against Congress and against Gandhi whom they blame for the trouble. Yet it is possible for El-Akhbar, a leading newspaper of Iraq, to say, "The Indians deserve independence, liberty and self-government as much as other free nations of the world."86/

Iran. "Persians have little interest in Indian affairs per se. Because of dislike of the United Kingdom as well as sympathy for the Indians, the authorities, though reserved, in general share the enthusiasm of the populace for India's cause and are swayed by the same motives."87/

Turkey. In a communication to the Star of India on May 5, 1942, an estimate of Turkish opinion written for Indian consumption included the following statements:88/

"Much space has been given in the Turkish press to the problem of the Muslim minority in India, and it would seem that Turkey's interest was and is concentrated on its solution. This is partly true because Turkey...cannot help reacting with fellow-Muslims."

Turkey's interest mainly centers, however, in India's defenses and the fate of her own neutrality.

The Turkish press approves Britain's treatment of Muslims in general and exonerates her from the blame of deliberately alienating the Hindu and Muslim communities.

The Star of India reported at the time of the Cripps mission, "Turkey was interested to note whether during the negotiations Britain was in any way prepared to sacrifice the Muslim minority in order to find a solution. The fact that this has not been the case has pleased the Turks enormously..." But a more realistic opinion regarding Turkish attitude is the following from the American ambassador at Ankara: "Editorial opinion never mentions Muslims or claims of the League. They think Gandhi's movement ill-timed, but in peace times would sympathize with Congress."89/

Egypt. Popular reaction in Egypt is generally in sympathy with Indians and Indian Nationalism. There has been some confusion because the Muslim League has not made common cause with Congress against the British.90/

Jawaharlal Nehru is a personal friend of Premier Mustafa Nahas Pasha, and in his Autobiography reveals that he has had a "warm welcome" from the leaders of the Wafd party: "I was glad to meet them again and to discuss our common problems in the light of the fast developing world situation. Some months later a deputation from the Wafd party visited us in India and attended our annual Congress session".91/ Little wonder this traditional affinity holds over any communal tie with the Muslim League.

Saudi Arabia. Arabia is dependent on Indian imports for so much of its food that the first worry of the government over disturbances in India was the possibility of curtailment through tie-up of transportation.

Saudi Arabia is Wahhabiist, that is, fundamentalist, and is concerned with the fulfillment of Muslim orthodoxy. There has been little popular reaction to the India situation. The Arabs of Arabia, thinking more intensely in Islamic terms than nationalist, would probably feel that a pagan (Gandhi) is threatening Muslim interests. The whole matter seems to concern them little.92/

It may be that the espousal of the cause of the Muslim League would have some economic basis, in that the pilgrimage to Mecca is still a fact, and the League would be more likely to insist on its continuance than would an Indian government. A Pakistan would be another sovereign Muslim state and closer to the Islamic ideal.

China. It may be well to add a note on the attitude of a group which stands as a minority within a vast population of non-Muslims. China has been particularly concerned with India's attitudes, has shown herself sympathetic towards Indian nationalism, and is desperately eager to see internal difficulties resolved so that a united India can lend every effort to the prosecution of the war. In an effort to help, China has discovered where one key to the solution lies--in convincing Indian Muslims that all will be well with them in a democratic India and that loyalty to Islam does not depend on political status. To this end at least two Chinese Muslims have been sent on mission to India. Othman K.K. Woo, representing the Chinese Islamic National Federation, was sent to interpret the relationship of China's Muslims to Chinese nationalism. He emphasized the zeal of his fellow-Muslims in China for Islam, their enthusiasm for Arabic and Islamic studies, often carried on in El-Azhar University in Cairo. On the other hand, Chinese Muslims "are nationalists to a man," and in the realms of politics and economics, there is no difference because they are Muslims. In answer to direct questioning, Mr. Woo called "absurd" the idea that his loyalty to his country could ever be in conflict with his loyalty to his faith.93/ He brought

with him letters for Maulana Abul Kalam Azad from leading Chinese Muslims, among them General Omar Pai Chung-si, President of the Chinese Islamic National Federation, Deputy Chief of the Chinese General Staff, said to be a right-hand man of Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Woo expressed the intention of Chinese Muslims to send students to Aligarh and Osmania Universities to bring the Muslim communities of the two countries closer together.

General Pai Chung-si at a mass meeting of the Chinese Muslims in connection with the Barahwafat (twelve days of Muhammad's illness) festival appealed to the Muslims of India to sink their differences with the Hindus and other communities and fight against the Japanese. He said in part: "We Chinese Muslims do not know much about the internal politics of Indian Muslims; but we can assure them that Islam is never in danger, nor will it ever be threatened by any force, material or spiritual." The answer of an Indian Muslim compared India with China: (1) Chinese Muslims never ruled China; (2) there is no caste in China--hence the Muslim is not an outcast in Chinese society; (3) religion has played second fiddle in China--not so in India; (4) there is as yet no cultural rivalry.

Summary. There is a sentimental religious sympathy with Indian Muslims existing in other Islamic countries, which in the case of Saudi Arabia is very real. Elsewhere when it comes to a choice between sympathy with the Muslim League or with nationalism, the stronger affinity is with nationalism, especially in countries where there has been a struggle between the nationalist forces and Great Britain or France. What is true of Egypt, and in less degree of Iraq, is probably also true of Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Algiers.

Turkey is concerned directly with her intolerable condition in relation to the war. Her normal sympathies would scarcely recognize that she has a religious association with Indian Muslims which

should lead to political sympathy with the Muslim League's communalistic position.

Iran, so recently shown the emptiness of her sovereignty, will sympathize with the anti-British element in the Indian situation. She is traditionally Shiah and has had a long rebellion against the Sunni Muslims. This fact weakens the communal tie with Indian Muslims, who are about 92 percent Sunnis.

Afghanistan may as well be classed with Muslim India, so closely are her destinies bound up with northwestern India and any possible Pakistan.

Any diplomatic or military move by Britain or the United Nations contradicting the claims of the Muslim League would be judged on its merits by Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Judgment would be colored, or even determined, by communal issues alone in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.

## CONCLUSION

21. Summary.

The proposal for Pakistan emanates from a large section of the Indian Muslim community, though not the entire community. It grows out of the 900-year old hostility between Muslims and Hindus. The two groups have widely different views of religion and social organization and express themselves in widely dissimilar art forms and literature. The conflict is especially sharp on the subject of religion. Though the Muslims are a minority group, their sense of community is so much stronger than that of the Hindus that they can compete on fairly equal terms. Since the Muslims have a theory of the state which in its strictest application would lead them to use force as a means of establishing Islam throughout the world, they are a constant potential peril to Indian national unity. During the latter part of the 18th century and early part of the 19th, the Muslim strength in India had waned, and from being political rulers before the rise of British power they declined to a community second in importance to the Hindus. Efforts were made in the middle and latter half of the 19th century to raise the educational and economic level of the Muslims. In the 20th century the conflict between the two groups which before then had been economic, educational, and religious, became political also as each strove for legislative representation and political patronage under the various constitutional reforms that were granted India in 1909, 1919, and 1935. Certain sections of the Muslim community became convinced that it could never gain equality with the Hindus in a single united Indian nation but must seek to have the prevailingly Muslim sections separated from the prevailingly Hindu sections and created into a separate Muslim state. This proposed state has come to be known as Pakistan. The idea has most vogue in

those parts of India where the population is most evenly divided between Muslims and Hindus.

The promoter of Pakistan is the Muslim League under its president Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who represents in his own attitude the pride, sense of frustration, and feeling of inferiority that have led large parts of the Muslim group to seek for Pakistan. The strength of the League appears to be not merely that derived from the Muslim support of the Pakistan issue; rather the natural strength the League would normally possess has been artificially enhanced by the prestige it derives from the serious consideration the British give the Pakistan idea. It is possible that the British are led, either knowingly or unknowingly, to overrate the Muslim League, because they see in it the strongest hostile force in India to the Indian National Congress. Many Muslims stoutly oppose Pakistan but the movement is nevertheless strong enough to have exacted concessions from Hindus as well as from the British. It is not, however, to be thought that the Islamic world as a whole cares about the attainment of Pakistan by Indian Muslims. Rather, most of the Islamic world is indifferent to the idea or actually hostile, and its sympathies lie with the Indian nationalists. It is more concerned about the question of India's political independence than about the program to exalt or even conserve Indian Islam.

22. Toward Resolution of the Pakistan Issue.

If the Pakistan proposal should be put into effect, the result would be to destroy the present political unity of India. Every great ruler the country has ever had has hoped to achieve such a unity, not merely to enhance his own power but also to give the country necessary internal stability and put it in a position to ward off an attack from outside. Two great rulers went far toward achieving the unity--Asoka in the 3rd century B.C. and Akbar in the 16th century A.D. The British rule in India has come even nearer to success than these two, the only deficiency in its holdings being the part of Afghanistan adjacent to the Indian border which is needed to provide a "scientific" line of defense. The British have been intensely proud of the unification of India, and justly so; any plan for India's future which would divide the country would negate their whole previous policy. It would be especially unfortunate to separate the northwestern part of India from the rest, because that part is not economically self-sufficient, though it may have the mineral resources to make it so in the future. At present it gets help peacefully from the rest of the country; if it were an independent state, it might feel compelled to meet its needs by conquest. History might then repeat itself: the northwest might try to create an empire of the rest of India.

Not only would Pakistan be disruptive in India, it would also be a menace to world peace. As a small and poor nation it would seek alliances with other nations to build up its position through power politics. Its lack of industry would not prevent it from acquiring arms; there would be manufacturers in other lands to supply them. Other small nations, such as Afghanistan, Iran, or Thailand, might become allies of Pakistan, all perhaps under the aegis of Japan.

Or it might associate itself with some large power, such as Russia or China, and in so doing lead other nations to form counter-alliances with one another. Possibly it would create a new form of pan-Islamism, the facade of religion used to mask burning political ambition. It would be likely to foster the very kind of divided world which makes for war instead of an organization among nations to help them live in peace. It would be a movement toward the 19th century instead of an expression of modern political ideology.

Yet it must be recognized that Pakistan has deep psychological roots. It springs from the general dissatisfaction of Indians that their country is one of the lowly and they themselves are of little consequence in the world's councils. Hindus react to this feeling by asserting themselves against the British. Muslims oppose not only the British rule but the Hindu majority in their land, which is still closer to them and a more obvious excuse for their inferior position. To the older Muslims Pakistan is the suddenly discovered hope that would have fulfilled their own disappointments. To the youth it is a symbol of battle and achievement, a goal for their yet untried energy.

Pakistan as a program may be dangerous for India, yet the energy focussed on it is one of India's greatest possessions. If that same energy can be directed toward some wider purpose, the country will profit accordingly.

Since Pakistan is based upon communal distrust, the final disposition of the idea depends upon dissolving that distrust. This result will come with education and the development of new interests in India. An increase in Indian industry will release both energy and enthusiasm which are now consecrated to the perpetuation of religious prejudices. A new political outlook might give direction to the same end; for example, promotion of a political order based upon a liberal, if not radical, social theory might have this result; even an intense

and skilful promotion of a campaign for national independence might divert the mind of India from dissension and give it unity. This would be especially likely if the campaign concentrated on the constructive nation-building side of national life and did not confine itself to mere constitution-making. At the moment, however, Pakistan is the chief symptom of the communal illness which prevents India from attaining independence.

These remarks apply to the long-term and complete cure of the communal illness. For the immediate present the problem is to avoid actual civil warfare, or perhaps only internal disorders, springing from Hindu-Muslim antipathy. To achieve this, the Pakistan crisis must be avoided. Propaganda against it and some kind of temporary compromise on the issue are needed. It may be possible for Hindus and Muslims to agree on a united Indian state composed of provinces with an even higher degree of autonomy than the present provinces possess, while the central government would have limited powers, such as defense, customs, and communications. The Indian (native) States would be constituted into new provinces, many of them being combined in a single administrative unit. This would in effect be the creation of a loose federation.

Some form of compromise is needed if India is to cease her internal quarreling and get on with the war. It is to the interest of America, the United Nations, as well as India, that the Congress, the League, the Mahasabha, and the Government of India should reach an agreement. Our own policy might well be to urge strongly all those concerned to postpone final settlement of internal issues, including above all the issue of Pakistan.

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Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

63

END

RESTRICTED

# PAKISTAN

U.S.S.R.

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

KASHMIR and JAMMU

PUNJAB

STATES PUNJAB

PUNJAB STATES

BALUCHISTAN

PUNJAB STATES

RAJPUTANA

SIND

NORTHWEST ZONE

UNITED PROVINCES

TIBET

NEPAL

BHUTAN

ASSAM

GWALIOR

CENTRAL INDIA

BIHAR

BENGAL

EASTERN STATES

STATES OF WESTERN INDIA

CENTRAL INDIA

CENTRAL PROVINCES

ORISSA STATES

BURMA

EASTERN ZONE

BERAR

BOMBAY

ORISSA

EASTERN STATES

HYDERABAD

DECCAN STATES

GOA (Portuguese)

MADRAS

MYSORE

PONDICHERRY (French)

KARIKAL (French)

MADRAS STATES

CEYLON

64 72 80 88 96

32 24 16 8

## INDIA — PRESENT POLITICAL DIVISIONS

- BRITISH INDIA
- LEASED AREAS under BRITISH ADMISTRATION
- INDIAN (Native) STATES
- TRIBAL AREAS

0 100 200 300 MILES

## PAKISTAN — AS PROPOSED BY:—

1933 MOSLEM LEAGUE
SIR MUHAMMAD IQBAL
Northwest Zone only

PRESENT MOSLEM LEAGUE
Northwest and Eastern Zones

DR. AMBEDKAR

C. RAHMAT ALI

MAP NO 1013
25 NOV 1942

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